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ABSTRACT 
In South Africa, municipal councils are accorded a legal status and authority of a 
deliberative legislative body.  This is considered critical for the municipal council to 
establish appropriate structures, processes and systems for effective oversight, 
particularly, oversight of budget execution.  However, indications are that, the current 
legal and institutional measures need to be strengthened to enable municipal council 
to exercise oversight of the budget execution. 
 
Literature review conducted in this study highlighted executive dominance, lack of 
technical capacity, lack of access to relevant information and partisan attitude as key 
factors constraining elected representatives in general from exercising oversight of 
budget execution.  In addition, the review identified institutional and behavioural 
criteria as the normative framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
current legal and institutional measures for oversight of budget execution in South 
African municipalities.    
 
An extensive review of the relevant local government legal provisions highlighted the 
authority of the municipal council, internal rules, reporting processes, council 
committees and the research capacity, as key aspects of the institutional measures 
required for oversight of budget execution.  Equally, the review accentuated the 
ability and willingness of non-executive councillors to exercise oversight of budget 
execution as key behavioural factors.               
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The study contends that the municipal council must use its legal authority to 
reinforce mechanisms for effective oversight of budget execution.  In addition, the 
municipal council needs to provide an enabling leadership and governance 
environment that encourages and support non-executive councillors to actively 
engage in budget oversight processes and activities. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The 2009 State of Local Government Overview Report compiled by the Department 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs indicates that for the year ended 
2008, more than a third of the 283 municipalities obtained either disclaimers of 
adverse opinions. 1   This overview report also indicates that a further 57 
municipalities received qualified audit opinions in 2007/08, which brings the total of 
municipalities with qualified, disclaimer and or adverse opinion to 152 (54%).  This 
report highlighted among other challenges the ‘lack of controls and accountability 
systems’ as some of the problems contributing to the lack of sound finance 
governance and management in municipalities.         
 
Furthermore, the overview report mentioned above indicates that 35 municipalities 
overspent their total adjusted budgets to the total amount of R2.6 million while 182 
municipalities under-spent to the amount of R19,1 billion.  Likewise, 177 
municipalities under spent to the amount of R7.3 billion and 32 municipalities 
overspent to the amount R350 million of their adjusted capital spending.2  
 
One of the reasons given for the fiscal problems affecting municipalities is a lack of 
effective budget oversight.   It is generally accepted that effective budget oversight 
                                                                
1 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government Review Report National 
State of Local Government Assessment (2009) 55. 
2 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2009) 62. 
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has the potential to minimise incidents of corruption, wasteful expenditure, under-
spending on capital expenditure, unauthorised expenditure and over-expenditure.    
 
As the legislative authority in the municipality, the municipal council has the 
responsibility to ensure that municipal resources are utilised effective and efficiently.  
Equally, by vesting the budget oversight responsibility in the municipal council, the 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 confirms the status of the municipal 
council as “the highest authority in the municipality" that must ensure that the budget 
is properly executed.3              
 
In the South African context, the responsibility placed on ‘non-executive councilors, 
as elected representatives of the community’ to exercise effective budget oversight is 
generally considered as essential to improve municipal fiscal accountability and 
discipline.4    
 
The enhanced status of the municipal councils created an expectation that they will 
utilise their amplified role to engage effectively in the planning and budgeting, 
revenue and expenditure management, reporting and oversight processes of the 
municipality.  It was also anticipated that municipal councils will now be in a position 
to play a meaningful role in ensuring ‘improved budget execution, reporting on 
performance and obtaining value for money’.5  
 
                                                                
3 National Treasury Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2008) 7. 
4 National Treasury Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2008) 159. 
5 National Treasury Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2006) 7. 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
However, indications are that the current budget oversight processes of the 
municipal councils have not yielded the desired outcomes and therefore need to be 
strengthened. Efforts to strengthen the municipal councils to exercise budget 
oversight must be comprehensive and address factors such as whether the 
municipal councils are (a) ‘legally empowered to intervene in the budgeting 
processes, (b) endowed with the required technical capacities, (c) committed and 
have the necessary political will, and (d) governed within an environment that is 
conducive’ to effective oversight of budget execution.6   
 
In addition, deliberate attention must be paid towards further consolidating the legal 
and institutional measures contemplated by the Constitution,7 the Municipal Finance 
Management Act, the Municipal Structures Act 8 and the Municipal Systems Act,9  to 
promote democratic, accountable and developmental local government. 
 
  
                                                                
6 Santiso C ‘Legislatures and Budgeting Oversight in Latin America:  Strengthening Public Finance 
Accountability in Emerging Economies’ OECD Journal on Budgeting 4 (2) (2004) 53.  
7 Constitution of the Republic South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter Constitution). 
8 Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (hereafter Structures Act). 
9 Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (hereafter Municipal Systems Act). 
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1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Indications are that the current legal and institutional measures in place to 
strengthen the municipal council to exercise effective budget oversight are 
inadequate.  The 2009 State of Local Government Overview Report and a number of 
local government audit reports have suggested the need to strengthen measures to 
enable the non-executive councillors to exercise budget oversight.   
 
The study focuses on how to enhance the existing laws, policies and practice to 
enable municipal councils to ensure that the implementation of the budget conforms 
to the adopted budget.   Specifically, the study will look at what laws, policies and 
practice are required to enhance the municipal councils’ processes and activities 
designed to ensure that the executive and administrative structures adhere to the 
approved budget. 
 
1.3. FOCUS OF THE STUDY 
The focus of the study will be on oversight of the budget execution.  The study will 
not be extended to the role played by external structures such as the national and 
provincial treasuries, Auditor-General and the provincial standing committees on 
public accounts (SCOPAs).            
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1.4. METHODOLOGY     
The study is based on a desktop research.  Acts of Parliament, case law, academic 
journal articles, reports, circulars and manuals are used extensively.  The internet is 
also used.  In addition, the study draws from previous relevant studies conducted in 
other countries especially in developing countries.  Considerable reference is drawn 
from research materials on national legislatures as there is currently limited data 
available specifically on municipal budget oversight. 
 
The author also used his own experience in matters of budget oversight in local 
government.  The author has conducted training programmes on municipal finance 
and budgeting.  He has also trained councillors on issues of governance and 
democracy.    
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION   
The concept of legislative oversight has been a critical feature of debates on the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Even though it is often conflated with terms such as 
accountability, monitoring and scrutiny of the executive and administrative structure, 
legislative oversight has developed as a sovereign concept that describes the nature 
of the legislature’s activities in ensuring that executive behaviour is in accordance 
with legislative intent.  
 
The concept as well as the vocabulary of legislative oversight is interpreted in 
different ways.  It is therefore imperative that the concept of legislative oversight is 
explored to enable an understanding of the topic of study and the approach taken in 
it.   In addition, this chapter reflects on how the available literature describes the 
meaning, methods and the purpose of legislative oversight.   
 
2.2 DEFINING OVERSIGHT  
The literature is replete with different definitions of oversight.10  Oleszek defines 
oversight as ‘supervision or watchfulness’ which denotes authority to oversee, 
monitor, review, or evaluate performance and or operations. 11   Another useful 
                                                                
10 Rockman B ‘Legislative–Executive Relation and Legislative Oversight’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 
9 (3) (August 1984) 390. 
 
11 Oleszek J Congressional Oversight  An Overview Congressional Research Service (2010) 4.   
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definition of oversight is provided by Lemos.12   According to Lemos, oversight 
describes the nature of the relationship between the legislature and the executive in 
terms of the former having the right to monitor, supervise and control as well as the 
latter having an obligation to subject itself to scrutiny.     
 
2.3 LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
Taking the definition of Lemos forward, this study uses the legislative as an adjective 
to oversight.  The term legislative is often used synonymously with terms such as 
political or parliamentary when discussing the notion of separation of powers.       
 
In general, the term legislative connotes the authority of the legislature to act in the 
interest and on behalf of the public.  This authority provides the legislature with 
implied legal and political justification and legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of 
the public.     
 
As a concept, legislative oversight has evolved progressively from being a neglected 
function of the legislature to one positioned at the core of its functions.  The notable 
prominence of legislative oversight can be attributed to the growing levels of distrust 
between the legislature and the executive, as well as the complex nature of 
government administration. 
 
                                                                
12 Lemos L Legislative Oversight of the Executive Branch in Six Democracies in Latin America A 
Paper Delivered at the Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Workshop (2010) 37.  
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Therefore, oversight is a distinct legislative function.  The following quote attributed 
to Woodrow Wilson, captures very succinctly the essence of legislative oversight: 
‘It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every 
affair of government and to talk much about what is sees.  It is meant to be 
the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its 
constituents.  Unless Congress has and uses every means of acquainting 
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of 
government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served’.13   
 
2.4 DEFINITIONS OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
Legislative oversight is a loosely defined concept that covers a wide variety of 
obligations and responsibilities of the legislature.14    According to Lemos, legislative 
oversight entails a process of holding the executive and other administrative 
structures accountable for their actions, or for their failure to act.    
 
Swartz and McCubbins define legislative oversight as deliberate ‘attempts to detect 
and remedy executive-branch violations of legislative goals’.15  Lemos also defines 
‘legislative oversight as activities that encompass any kind of control performed by 
                                                                
13 Pearson B ‘Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function’ University of Kansas Law 
Review 23 (Winter 1975) 277-88. 
 
14 Lemos L Horizontal accountability in Brazil Congressional oversight of the executive branch (2006) 
17. 
15 Schwartz and McCubbins Congressional Oversight Overlooked Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms 
(1984) 169. 
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an intra-state set of institutions designed to constrain illegitimate or arbitrary power 
and to discourage abuses and illegalities perpetrated by the state itself’.16   
 
Authors define legislative oversight from different perspectives.  For example, 
Fölscher defines legislative oversight as a mechanism for assessing government 
initiatives and approving, amending or rejecting them before the fact or ex ante.17  
On the other hand, Pelizzo and Stapenhurts refer to legislative oversight as the 
obvious follow up on activity linked to decisions approved by the legislature.18 
 
Schick defines legislative oversight as the ‘review after the fact’, and puts emphasis 
on ‘investigatory activity of past administrative activity’.19  Similarly,   Harris refers to 
oversight as ‘inquiries about policies that are or have been in effect, investigations of 
past administrative actions, and the calling of the executive officers to account’.20   
 
Lyons and Thomas define legislative oversight as ‘encompassing all activities 
undertaken to influence administrative behaviour, during programme implementation 
as well as afterwards’.21   
 
                                                                
16
 Lemos (2006) 5.   
17
 Fӧlscher A ‘A Balancing Act:  Fiscal Responsibility, Accountability and the Power of the Purse’ 
OECD Journal on Budgeting, 6 (2) (2006) 18. 
18 Pelizzo R & Stapenhurts R Tool for Legislative Oversight An Empirical Investigation World Bank 
Institute (2004) 47. 
 
19 Schick A The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, and Process Washington (1995) 25. 
 
 
20 Harris J Congressional Control of Administration Washington D.C (1964) 38.  
 
21 Lyons W & Thomas L ‘Oversight in State Legislatures, Structural-Attitudinal Interaction’ American 
Politics Quarterly (1982) 10. 
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Ogul defines legislative oversight as “the behaviour of legislators, individually or 
collectively, formally or informally, which results in an impact on bureaucratic 
behaviour in relation to the structures and processes of policy implementation”.22 
 
The key distinction between the above definitions relates to the question when 
legislative oversight is exercised.  Is oversight exercised prior approval or 
authorisation of executive proposals, or during implementation of what was enacted 
or during the auditing stage.  In some instances, the definition is more encompassing 
and applicable to the entire continuum of legislative activities.   
 
For the purposes of this study Ogul’s definition is preferred.  This is because it 
highlights that the behaviour of the legislature is important in order for it to supervise 
and control the behaviour of the executive in policy implementation.  In addition, the 
reference to the structures and processes in the definition highlights the significance 
of the role of relevant structures and processes in effecting the behaviour of the 
legislature.     
 
2.5 THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
This section deals with the authority of the legislature in oversight processes and 
activities.  It assesses the authority of the legislature over the executive.  It 
specifically highlights how the authority of the legislature in financial matters enables 
the need for legislative oversight.   
 
                                                                
22 Ogul M Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy Studies in Legislative Supervision Pittsburgh (1976) 
7. 
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Strom states that the essence of parliamentary democracy is that ‘constitutional 
authority is delegated through a single chain of command’ whereby the legislature 
delegates to the executive.23  Consequently, the authority for legislative oversight 
emanates from the legislature being the supreme institution over all the constituent 
aspects of law making powers.         
 
Strom further suggests that ultimately legislatures serve as the ‘locus of executive 
decision making’.24  As a result, the legislature is often granted political and legal 
mechanisms to subject government activities to scrutiny in order to enable 
participation in all aspects of law-making and the implementation of government 
decisions.    
   
The authority to exercise oversight over the executive and administrative structures 
is either granted or implied in the legal and or political configurations of the relevant 
state or government.  The authority for oversight is mostly applied through legislative 
processes such as law making and budgets and often takes the form of 
authorisation, investigations and general inquiries of the executive.25  
 
The authority for oversight is also influenced by principle such as power of the purse 
that is mostly located in legislatures.   The concept of the power of the purse is 
explored in more detail below.   
                                                                
23 Strom K ‘Parliamentary Agenda Control and Legislative Outcomes in Western Europe’ Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 26 (1) (1995) 145. 
 
24 Strom (1995) 150. 
 
25 Rosenberg (2007) 4. 
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2.5.1 THE POWER OF THE PURSE 
The principle of the power of the purse which is the core subject of this research is a 
concept used to describe the authority of the legislature in approving, rejecting and 
amending budget proposals from the executive as well as monitoring the authorised 
appropriations.      
 
To highlight the power of the purse as a critical aspect of the authority of the 
legislature, Wehner states:           
 
‘This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and 
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate 
representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and 
for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.’26 
 
Stith states that ‘no money shall be drawn from Treasury, but in consequence of 
appropriations made by law’.27  This grants the legislature the authority to control the 
financial matters and activities exercised by the executive and administrative 
structures.   
 
The authority to exercise oversight as inferred from the principle of power of the 
purse, presupposes the ability to enforce compliance.  Accordingly, legislative 
                                                                
26 Wehner J ‘Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions’ (2006) 
Political Studies 54, 767-785.      
 
27 Stith K. ‘Congress Power of the Purse’ Yale Law Journal (1998) 1344.   
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oversight requires ‘absolute authority to construe and to effectuate’ the authorisation 
requirements.28          
 
2.6 PURPOSE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT  
The above discussion described the various definitions of legislative oversight.  It 
also highlighted the overarching intention of oversight as the way of ensuring that the 
behaviour of the executive and administrative structures is supervised and controlled 
in order to guarantee compliance with legislative intent.   
 
The purpose of oversight is to determine the effectiveness of policy implementation, 
prevent waste and dishonesty in the use of public resources by the executive and 
administrative structures.  The legislature also exercises oversight for the purpose of 
assessing the performance of the executive and administrative structures.29 
 
In addition, legislative oversight enables the legislature to access relevant 
information from the executive and administrative structures so that it can inform and 
enable the public to hold the entire government accountable.30 
 
2.7 TYPES OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
There are various types of legislative oversight.   Lemos indicates that ‘legislative 
oversight is a complex and dynamic activity that can hardly be understood under a 
single aspect’.31           
                                                                
28 Stith (1998) 1344. 
29 Kaiser M Oleszek J & Tatelman B Congressional Oversight Manual Congressional Research 
Service (2011) 41. 
 
30 Rosenberg (2007) 1. 
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Legislative oversight can be exercised formally or informally and at different stages 
of law making, implementation and auditing.    Santiso has developed a structured 
approach to distinguishing between various dimensions and forms of legislative 
oversight.32  According to him legislative oversight takes place in three approaches, 
namely ‘ex ante oversight, concurrent oversight and ex post oversight’.   
 
2.7.1 EX ANTE OVERSIGHT 
Ex ante legislative oversight is defined as the assessment of ‘expected effects and 
side-effects of a proposed legislation’.33  Ex ante oversight entails the legislature 
providing consent to the executive proposals by approving and delegating 
accordingly. It takes the form of scrutiny of a subject before a decision is taken by a 
legislature.    
      
It therefore, offers an opportunity for the legislature to determine and prescribe the 
behaviour of the executive from the outset.34  In addition, it enables a common 
understanding on the issue and minimises deviations from the legislative intent. 
 
The logic of ex ante oversight is that a legislature ‘defines procedural features of 
policy implementation in order to limit the range of executive and bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
31 Lemos (2006) 47. 
32 Santiso (2004) 28.   
33 Verschuuren J The Impact of Legislation A Critical Analysis of Ex Ante Evaluation Leiden and 
Button MA (2006) 3–4. 
 
34 Bar-Ilan A ‘Justice:  When Do we Decide’?  Connecticut Law Review  39 (3) (2007) 923. 
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choice’.35    An important feature of ex ante legislative oversight is the power of the 
legislature to approve, reject or amend the executive proposal.  This ‘power of prior 
authorisation’ which is inherent in the process and activities of ex ante legislative 
oversight facilitates the ultimate legitimacy and authority of the legislature in directing 
the behaviour of the executive.       
 
Ex ante legislative oversight is critical in prescribing the nature of delegation and 
accountability.  Once an issue has been subjected to ex ante oversight, the 
executive structures have the required certainty and legislative consent that can be 
adhered to.   They have been appropriately empowered in advance to plan, execute 
and account to the legislature.  
 
 
2.7.2 CONCURRENT OVERSIGHT 
Santiso identifies concurrent oversight as the legislative oversight approach that 
focuses on the behaviour of the executive during the ‘execution stage’ of policies, 
laws, programmes and or any other delegation by the legislature.36    
 
It refers to the activities of the legislature utilised to maintain continuous surveillance   
on how the executive is behaving towards the delegation or legislative intent.  
Therefore, concurrent legislative oversight is informed by the realisation that the 
                                                                
35 See, Gerber J Maestas C & Dometrius C ‘State legislative influence over agency rulemaking The 
utility of ex ante review’. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5 (1) (2005) 24-46. 
 
36
 Santiso (2004) 28.   
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legislature’s work does not end with approval or authorisation, it has the 
responsibility to ensure that decisions are brought to fruition.37   
 
Concurrent legislative oversight facilitates the deliberate in-year tracking and 
monitoring of financial and non-financial executive activities.  The strategic relevance 
of concurrent legislative oversight is that it ‘provides a mechanism for early detection 
and the immediate institution of remedial measures against executive and 
administrative deviations’.38   As a result, the legislature is able to institute immediate 
corrective measures against any executive behaviour which deviates from the 
approved delegation or mandate.            
 
2.7.3 EX POST OVERSIGHT  
Unlike the ex ante type legislative oversight and concurrent oversight, ex post 
oversight is conducted at the end of the implementation phase.39  Ex post oversight 
is exercised to examine whether performance is in accordance with the goals of 
enacted policy or approved programmes.   
 
The focus of ex post oversight is on the outcomes and impact of legislative decisions 
as well as on the executive behaviour in implementing them.  Consequently, 
effectiveness and efficiencies are mostly utilised as the measure of performance.  
The quality of goods, the outcomes achieved and resources utilised serve as the 
basis for the legislature to evaluate the performance of the executive.             
                                                                
37
 Strom K (1995) 155. 
 
38
 Salceda J Lecture on oversight experience of the House of Representatives (2001) 37.   
39 Santiso (2004) 2 
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2.8 CONCLUSION        
This chapter presented a variety of definitions of oversight and legislative oversight.  
It highlighted the authority of the legislature.  Most importantly, it accentuated the 
power of the purse as the foremost source of authority for legislative oversight.  
 
The chapter also identified the specific purpose of legislative oversight as being able 
to prevent, detect and correct the behaviour of the executive and administrative 
structures that is not in accordance with the legislative intent.   
 
Lastly, the three types of oversight were discussed.  Ex ante oversight was 
described as being able to facilitate the ultimate legitimacy and authority of the 
legislature in directing the behaviour of the executive before legislative authorisation 
is granted.  Concurrent oversight on the other hand was enabling the in-year tracking 
and monitoring of the activities of the executive and administrative structures.  Ex 
post oversight is used to assess the outcomes and impact of legislative decisions as 
well as on the executive behaviour in implementing them         
 
Having defined the concept of legislative and its inherent authority for oversight, the 
next chapter reviews the literature of oversight of budget execution and the role of 
the legislature exercise its concurrent oversight in budget execution.  The chapter 
assess how the legislative authority and its related measures are used to exercise 
concurrent oversight during budget execution.  It looks at what the legislature does to 
ensure that the executive collects and spend finances according to the approved 
budget.           
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CHAPTER THREE: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF BUDGET EXECUTION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter highlighted legislative oversight as an essential element of 
good governance.  It also indicated that oversight ensures that the executive governs 
in accordance with the legislature’s intent.   Equally, it was indicated that depending 
on the law, there are different types of oversight to supervise, control and monitor the 
executive.   
 
In an effort to develop an understanding of the legislative oversight of budget 
execution as the topic of the study it is essential that it is situated within a broader 
context of the role of the legislature in the budget process.   
 
This chapter reviews the literature that examines the structures, process and issues 
involved in oversight of the budget execution stage.  The main aim of this chapter is 
to provide a normative framework for legislative oversight over the execution of the 
budget.   
 
3.2 BUDGET GOVERNANCE       
The public budget is the nucleus of public finance.  It has emerged as a key 
requirement for good governance and is an inevitable legal and operational 
requirement for governments to play a meaningful role in the changing political, 
social and economic environment.   
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The budget is viewed as an instrument for achieving fiscal objectives and discipline.  
It is widely regarded as the sine qua non for good governance and an effective 
instrument for anchoring fiscal discipline.  Furthermore, it is regarded as a distinct 
and a complex process involving diverse stakeholders with different responsibilities 
to ensure the best possible way of collecting, utilising and accounting for public 
financial resources.             
     
Governments engage in budgeting as a process and to the budget as an outcome.  
As a process, the budget is navigated through formulation, approval, execution and 
auditing stages.  The navigation of the budget through these various institutions and 
mechanisms bears testimony to the importance of the governance of the budget in 
government.                 
 
Schavo-Campo and Tommasi argue that the concept of budget governance is used 
to ‘capture the dynamic aspect of the budgetary cycle, the institutional dimensions of 
public budgeting, and the political economy of public finance’.40  This is an important 
shift away from the traditional emphasis on collecting and spending money to a focus 
on the interaction of processes and structures shaping budget outcomes.  The shift 
has also elevated value for money and financial stewardship as important 
considerations with regard to public budgeting.   
 
The shift underscores the need to see the budget as both a technical exercise and a 
democratic process creating opportunities for the legislature and its related 
                                                                
40 Schavo-Campo & Tommasi (1999) 11.   
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institutions to supervise, oversee and control the budget.41  In the same vein, the 
emergence of principles such as accountability, transparency, efficiency and 
participation in budgeting can be attributed to the abovementioned shift.           
 
3.3 DEFINING THE BUDGET PROCESS 
The term process suggests a series of actions taken to achieve a particular goal.  
Therefore, the budget process is about a predictable flow of events and activities 
aimed at deciding on the collection and allocation of financial resources to achieve 
government objectives.42  
 
In most counties, the budget process is a cyclical and annual exercise consisting of 
activities that encompass drafting, approval, execution and audit.43   The cyclical 
nature of the budget process provides for key generic stages to take place in a 
distinct, sequenced mode.  While the application of these generic key stages differs 
across countries due to their respective legal and political environments, they 
generally comprise of the drafting stage, an approval stage, execution stage and an 
auditing stage. 
     
 The drafting stage marks the beginning of the budget process.  It is about 
forecasting and estimating revenue and expenditure as an activity that is 
dominated by the executive and administrative structures of government.   
                                                                
41 Santiso (2004) 3. 
42 Santiso (2004) 5.          
 
43 Santiso (2004) 7.          
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 The approval stage is largely a legislative activity.  During this stage, the 
executive tables revenue and expenditure proposals to the legislature which it 
considers and approves.  The approval of the budget proposal is considered 
as a significant manifestation of the authority of the legislature.    
 The execution stage, which is the focus of the study, follows the approval of 
the revenue and expenditure estimates.  The budget execution stage is the 
exclusive terrain of the executive structures.    
 The audit stage takes place after the financial year.  This stage is in essence 
a financial audit of government budgeting process.  In some instances the 
audit activity is expanded to include a performance audit.   Depending on the 
legal prescription applicable, the outcome of the audit is reported to the 
legislature. 
 
In most countries, the budget process as outlined above is approached as a 
collaborative exercise involving the legislature, the executive and internal and 
external independent audit institutions.  This collaboration is key to providing the 
necessary legitimacy to the budget process.  An effective budget process requires a 
division of responsibilities between the legislature, executive and the 
administration.44  The essence of this division of responsibilities is that it encourages 
constructive and democratic contestation between the legislature, the executive and 
administrative structures.   
 
                                                                
44 Allen & Tommasi Managing Public Expenditure A Reference Book for Transitional Countries (2001) 
49.  
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The budget process facilitates an environment for the setting of priorities, political 
approval, control by the legislature and audit by external bodies.  Ideally, this 
environment promotes good principles of budgeting, namely, ‘comprehensiveness, 
predictability, contestability, transparency and periodicity of the budget’.45 
 
Santiso points out that, as the operational heart of the system of democratic 
governance, the budget process is fundamental in realising the fiscal, administrative, 
financial and governance objectives.  Santiso identifies the following specific 
objectives:   
I. Financial control; 
II. Allocation of scares resources; 
III. Improving programme efficiency;  
IV. Creating political opportunity to exercise leadership; and 
V. Legitimating the state programmes.” 46 
 
3.4 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE BUDGET PROCESS 
The budget is a legally regulated process.  As a creature of statute, the budget 
process will thus differ from country to country. In some countries, the budget 
legislation originates from the constitution, while other counties regulate it with the 
use of statutes rather than the constitution. 47    The constitution is sometimes 
                                                                
45 Fӧlscher A  2006 ‘Introduction: African Experience with Budget Reform’ OECD Journal on 
Budgeting 6 (2).    
     
 
46 Santiso (2005) 2. 
47 Santiso (2004) 2 
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supplemented with other ordinary finance or budget laws and the legislature’s 
procedural rules to consolidate the legal framework for the budget.    
 
An emerging trend in democratic countries is that the budget laws govern the roles 
and responsibilities of the executive and the legislature in the budget.  Here, the 
predominant role of the executive is to prepare and execute the budget whilst the 
legislature exercises oversight throughout the formulation, and implementation of the 
budget.                     
 
In most developed countries, independent bodies such as the external audit have 
been established to exercise financial accountability and oversight.  The powers and 
responsibilities of these external audit institutions complement those of the executive 
and the legislature.    
 
The main purpose of legal framework on the budget is to provide a clear set of legal 
rules for the various steps of the budget process as well as specifying the roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors in the process.48   The legal framework also 
assists in ensuring that the budget principles are embodied in law rather than in less 
formal and temporary arrangements.  Most critically, the law is used to constrain the 
abuse of powers by key role players in the executive and legislature. 49     
          
                                                                
48 Lienert & Jung   2004 ‘The Legal Framework for Budget Systems An International Comparison’ 
OECD Journal on Budgeting  4 (3) (2004) 61. 
  
 
49 Lienert & Jung (2004) 61. 
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For the benefit of this study, it is important to note that a legal framework is critical in 
in clarifying the powers and the role of the legislature in the budget process and the 
extent to which the legislature can be involved in the execution stage of the budget 
process.       
 
3.5   OVERSIGHT OF BUDGET EXECUTION STAGE  
As indicated, the budget execution stage commences after the legislature has 
authorised or approved the budget.   It is defined as the expression of activities 
undertaken by the executive and the administration to collect and spend financial 
resources as contained in the approved budget. It involves a variety of administrative 
functions, accounting operations, treasury management, and control mechanisms.    
 
The approved budget is a duly enacted statute which cannot be changed or varied 
arbitrarily by executive or administrative structures.  Hence, the executive and 
administrative structures have a legal obligation to implement the budget as 
approved and changes on the appropriations can only be made by the legislature.50   
 
The budget execution stage is subjected to management and administrative 
procedures that entail, ‘planning, apportionment of expenditure authority, 
commitment, acquisition and verification and payments’.51  It consists of the phases 
outlined below.   
 
 
                                                                
50 Lane (1985) 248.     
51 Allen & Tommasi (2001) 211. 
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a) Apportionment of appropriations.   
b) Commitment stage. 
c) Acquisition and verification stage. 
d) Payment stage.  
 
The apportionment of the appropriations entails the release of funds to spending 
units.  It can include mechanisms such as notification of cash limits and funds 
transfer.  The commitment stage is where the future obligation to pay is incurred.  
It is about an order to award a contract for specified goods and services to be 
delivered and an obligation to pay the third party in terms of the contract.  The 
acquisition and verification stage is when goods are delivered and services are 
rendered and their conformity with the contract is verified.  Finally, the payment 
stage involves making payments through various instruments such as cheques, 
cash disbursed and electronic transfers.52     
 
 
3.5.1 THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE IN BUDGET EXECUTION    
The executive is usually the key structure responsible for ensuring that other 
government departments or spending agencies adhere to the budget execution 
phases.53    
 
The monitoring of budget execution is predicated on the notion that effective internal 
mechanisms for spending controls are critical for maintaining fiscal discipline.   The 
finance departments establish or provide for the establishment of centralised or 
                                                                
52 Allen & Tommasi (2001) 211. 
53 Schick (1999) 65.   
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internal control mechanisms to ensure that public financial resources are being used 
effectively and efficiently.54   The internal control mechanisms are more than just 
checking the accuracy of financial transactions.  They are used as mechanisms for 
ensuring effective stewardship of public financial resources.55   
 
The effective stewardship of public financial resources requires that control 
mechanisms should be underpinned by effective monitoring of budget execution.  
Peters defines monitoring of budget execution as ‘analytical activities examining 
whether money is spent for the right purpose, at the right time, and by the right 
entity’.56     
 
3.6 THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN BUDGET EXECUTION  
While it is generally acknowledged that the executive as the dominant structure in 
the budget execution stage should devise internal expenditure control mechanisms 
during budget execution, it is equally accepted that these internal control 
mechanisms within the executive can be applied arbitrarily.  Accordingly, the 
executive is not in the best position to exercise effective self-control.   
 
Therefore, the oversight exercised by the legislature is equally important.  This is 
mainly because executive discretion requires effective legislative oversight to ensure 
                                                                
54 Schick (1999) 65. 
55 Schick (1999) 65. 
56 Peters L Sound Budget Execution for Poverty Reduction A background Paper for the World Bank 
Institute Programme of Fiscal Policy for Poverty Alleviation Module on Budget Execution (2002).   
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compliance with approved appropriations.  Failure to exercise effective legislative 
oversight often results in perilous and fiscal ill-discipline.57       
 
3.6.1 CONCURRENT LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF BUDGET EXECUTION 
As indicated in Chapter Two, the nature of oversight that takes place during 
implementation is referred to as concurrent oversight.   Concurrent legislative budget 
oversight as it occurs during budget execution is specifically about in-year control, 
supervision and monitoring of the executive behaviour with regard to the 
implementation of appropriations.  In-year supervision, monitoring and control denote 
a continuous process throughout the financial year.     
 
Similarly, in-year legislative oversight of budget execution is ideally about activities 
that highlight issues such as why the expenditure is different from the appropriations.   
Furthermore, anomalies such as leakages, dishonesty, over-or-underspending, 
wasteful, irregular and unauthorised expenditure are identified and addressed early 
within the financial year.   
 
3.7 THE PURPOSE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF BUDGET EXECUTION 
The authority vested in the legislature to approve the budget imposes the duty to 
oversee the implementation of approved budget.  The overall responsibility for 
stewardship of public financial resources obligates the legislature to not only approve 
appropriation but to also exercise control over these resources.      
 
                                                                
57 Santiso & Belgrano (2004) 3.    
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Legislative oversight of budget execution establishes a ‘win-win situation’ for both the 
legislature and the executive.58  The executive structures provide the necessary 
expertise and cohesive policy-making capacity while the legislature on the other 
hand enhances the accountability and helps the executive to access the diverse 
constituencies that are affected by budget decisions.       
 
Legislative oversight of budget execution highlights the intention of the legislature to 
be informed of what is happening as well as to make the executive and the 
administrative structures account for their actions.  Similarly, it indicates a deliberate 
effort by the legislature to monitor and assess actions or inactions of the executive 
and administrative structures.  The assessment and monitoring could result in the 
legislature approving, changing, rejecting, condemning, and restraining the behavior 
of the executive and administrative structures.           
 
The legislative oversight of budget execution activities endows the legislature with 
relevant information to ensure that the executive does not behave in a manner that 
strays beyond or outside of the approved appropriations.59  
 
Effective oversight of budget execution should ensure a budget that is implemented 
with few significant derivations from plan and low level of corruption in public 
expenditure.60  The high transparency in budget execution ensures that public funds 
                                                                
58 Posner P & Park C  ‘Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process Recent Trends and Innovations’ 
OECD Journal of Budgeting 7(3) (2007) 99. 
59 Fӧlscher (2006) 7.    
 
60
 Schick (1999) 65. 
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are spent for authorised public purposes; and reported expenditure corresponds to 
actual expenditure.61 
 
3.8 CHALLENGES FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF BUDGET EXECUTION  
The above discussion indicated that the legislative oversight over the execution of 
the budget has a clear and critical purpose.  However, the legislative oversight of 
over budget execution is experiencing challenges.  These challenges can be 
categorised into executive dominance, lack of technical advisory capacity, weak 
legislative institutions, the lack of access to relevant information and partisan 
attitude.62  These challenges, both individually and collectively have the potential to 
negatively affect legislative oversight over the execution of the budget.   
 
3.8.1 EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE 
Unrestrained executive dominance tends to relegate the legislature to a mere 
rubber-stamp. 63   Equally, executive dominance in the budget process has the 
tendency to allow for unmitigated executive discretion in budget execution.  The 
unmitigated executive discretion results from the legislature’s lack of active 
involvement in the drafting and execution stages of the budget.  Therefore, the 
executive dictates on the key aspects of the budget process.  This creates a 
challenge for the legislature to play a significant role in the budget process and 
consequently, its oversight responsibilities are marginalised.       
 
                                                                
61 Schick (1999) 65. 
62 Santiso & Belgrano (2004) 8.   
63
 Santiso & Belgrano (2004) 8.   
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3.8.2 TECHNICAL ADVISORY CAPACITY 
Members of the legislature are generally not appointed on the basis of their 
knowledge or expertise on issues such as the budget or public finance.64  Therefore, 
the lack of technical capacity on the part of members of the legislature and research 
and other relevant advice and information, constitutes a critical challenge for 
effective oversight over the execution of the budget.   
 
3.8.3 WEAK LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS      
Committees and the speaker are some of the institutions in the legislature that play 
an important role in budget oversight.  If they are weak, this impedes the legislature 
to exercise budget oversight.  Legislative committees as the main vehicle for 
legislatures to exercise oversight over the execution of the budget are often weak 
due to the lack of information and technical capacity.65   In addition, the Speaker’s 
inability to assert the authority of the legislature and its committees undermines its 
ability to ensure the equilibrium between the executive and the legislature.66   
 
3.8.4   ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION  
The lack of access to independent and relevant information on the budget and 
related financial reports is detrimental to oversight.67  Furthermore, delayed and 
unprocessed information is also inadequate for the purposes of oversight of budget 
execution.  Equally, the lack of access to relevant and timely information by 
                                                                
64
 Santiso & Belgrano (2004) 24. 
65
 Santiso & Belgrano (2004) 24. 
66 Santiso & Belgrano (2004) 24. 
67
 Santoso (2004) 64. 
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members of the legislature perpetuates the unmitigated dominance of the executive 
in the budget process.   
 
3.8.5 PARTISAN ATTITUDE  
It is generally observed that when the interests of the legislative majority and the 
executive branch coincide, the majority has little incentive to oversee the executive 
resulting in weak oversight of the budget.68   There is tendency to strictly prescribe 
the manner in which the members of the legislature from the ruling coalition relate to 
the executive structures.  This partisan attitude is mainly shaped by political values, 
groupings and caucus directives    
         
Therefore, the attitude of the members of the legislature towards oversight is often 
influenced by the political parties.69   Members of the legislature, often those from the 
ruling parties or coalitions operate under stringent party discipline systems or 
coalitions arrangements which are often ‘detrimental to the effective exercise of 
legislative budget oversight’.70  
 
3.9 CRITERIA FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OVER THE EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET   
Legislatures need to address the above challenges by deliberately strengthening  
institutional powers, structures, processes and attitude to address these challenge 
that inhibit effective oversight over the execution of the budget.          
                                                                
68 Santiso (2004) 70. 
69 Calland R Building a House of Integrity Parliamentary Ethics in the Case of the new South Africa A 
Paper Presented to the International Conference on Corruption IACC Lima Peru (1997) 34.  .  
70 Santiso (2004) 69. 
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This section will discuss the criteria for legislative oversight over the execution of the 
budget.  Since the focus of the thesis is to strengthen the institutional and 
behavioural measures for the oversight over the execution of the budget, the criteria 
prescribed in this section form the normative framework for the study.  The study 
uses the institutional and behavioural criteria to inform responses to the institutional 
and behavioural deficiencies identified in challenges for legislative oversight over the 
execution of the budget.   Therefore, this normative framework will be used to assess 
the effectiveness of oversight over the execution of the budget within the local 
government system of South Africa. 
 
Institutional criteria provide a reference point against which the appropriateness of 
the legal powers, structures and processes can be reviewed.  Likewise, the 
behavioural criteria provide an established set of rules guiding the conduct of the 
members of the legislature in exercising effective oversight over the execution of the 
budget.     
 
3.9.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA 
Institutional criteria require the presence of statutory instruments laid down in a 
constitution, statutes, regulations and standing rules.  These statutory instruments 
inform the legislature’s authority and processes in exercising oversight over the 
execution of the budget.     
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3.9.1.1 AUTHORITY 
The statutory instruments must explicitly prescribe for the legislature to ensure that 
all government expenditure is based on law or approved appropriations.71  According 
to Lienert and Jung, it must be clearly stated in all or some of the statutory 
mechanisms that the executive must respect the authority of the legislature in terms 
budget execution and cannot therefore commit public money for expenditure without 
the knowledge of the elected representatives.72 
 
3.9.1.2 INTERNAL RULES 
In addition to providing for the authority of the legislature to ensure that public 
expenditure is based on the approved appropriations, these statutory instruments 
should further establish internal rules to fortify the legislature’s role in the budget 
process and specifically, in budget execution.   Internal rules must complement other 
instruments to ensure that the legislature exercises budget oversight in a manner 
that is effective as well as comprehensive.        
 
Many legislatures use a variety of instruments for budget oversight in general which 
include debates, hearings and questions.73   These instruments include: 
a) Debates in the plenary:   Debates on the budget execution provide a valuable 
opportunity for the legislature to get information on how the executive is realising 
the objectives approved budget.         
                                                                
71 Lienert and Jung (2004) 134.     
72 Lienert and Jung (2004) 134. 
73 Inter-Parliamentary Union Tools for parliamentary oversight (2007) 31. 
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b) Interpellation:  This is a parliamentary procedural act of demanding an 
explanation usually from the member of the executive.  It is used by members of 
the legislature to exercise control over the executive or a member of the 
executive.  An interpellation has two features, it gives rise to a general debate 
and it carries a political sanction which can lead to a vote of no confidence. 74  
These features highlight the force of the interpellation as compared to a plenary 
debate.  Accordingly, an interpellation is a critical instrument that that can be 
used to force a member of the executive to account.75        
 
While these instruments are used to exercise general legislative oversight, they are 
equally relevant and appropriate for oversight on budget execution.   
 
3.9.1.3 REPORTS 
Reports are critical for the legislature for exercising its oversight function.  
Accordingly, the law must specify ‘the scope and contents of the budget execution 
reports and financial accounts’.76  The law must also prescribe the frequency and the 
process of submitting and discussing the reports.     
 
The frequency of reports can be phased into monthly, quarterly, mid-year and year-
end reports.  Lienert and Jung propose that quarterly reports must contain detailed 
information on the revenue and expenditure.  The mid-year report must be a 
comprehensive update on budget implementation and it should be released at the 
                                                                
74 Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007) 78.  
75 Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007) 78.   
76 Lienert & Jung (2004) 143.   
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end of the mid-year period.  Lastly, accounts and annual report should show 
compliance with the budgeted levels of revenue and expenditure authorised by the 
legislature.  The format of the accounts should be identical to the budget 
presentation.77   
 
3.9.1.4 COMMITTEES  
Legislatures structured after the Westminster system generally establish committees 
for exercising oversight.  Committees are often regarded as the most effective 
means of underpinning the authority of the legislature with regard to oversight.  They 
‘help to deconstruct large, complex budgets and divide the labour of reviewing such 
massive amounts of information’. 78   Committees also encourage constituent 
members to acquire sufficient expertise to effectively compare with and, when 
necessary, challenge the executive and administrative structures.     
    
The ability of the committee to among other things, undertake in-depth investigations 
or conduct inquiries, summon political executives and senior bureaucrats and access 
information, determines the potential to exercise budget oversight.   Sometimes the 
law requires that specific legislative committee such as a budget committee or 
equivalent must be established for the exercise of budget oversight. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
77
 Lienert & Jung (2004 145. 
78 Posner & Park (2007) 81.  
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Legislative committees should have the following features to be effective:      
 
 Independence - is the committee able to function independently of the 
executive and administrative structures? 
 Power – does the committee have the appropriate power to call for and 
examine witnesses and papers? 
 Information – does it have access to the information needed to render the 
executive and administrative structures accountable? 
 Resources – are resources available to support committees to perform the 
oversight function.79 
 
3.9.1.5 RESEARCH CAPACITY  
Individual members and committees of the legislature need to have access to 
independent information on budget to effectively oversee the execution of the 
budget.80   To this end, there is need for members and committees of the legislature 
to have access to independent research capacity to minimise the reliance on the 
executive structures.       
 
Independent research capacity will enhance the credibility and accuracy of 
information.  In addition, members and committees of the legislature will receive the 
necessary support and capacity in terms of quality and impartial scrutiny of budget 
and financial information.    
 
                                                                
79 Ahmed (2000) 30. 
80 Santiso (2004)  64 
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The institutional criteria discussed above reflect the centrality of the legal 
instruments, processes and structures as the foundation that shape legislative 
oversight over the execution of the budget.     
 
 
3.9.2 BEHAVIOURAL CRITERIA   
The presence of instruments adopted and used by legislatures does not guarantee 
effective budget oversight.  As indicated, these instruments enhance the legislature’s 
legal authority to scrutinise and monitor the executive and administrative structures 
during the entire budget process.  However, the ability of the legislature to exercise 
oversight does not depend only on legal and structural factors.   
 
The behaviour and attitude of members of the legislature are also crucial in oversight 
processes and activities.  This ensures that there is no divergence between what is 
statutorily prescribed and actual behaviour of members of the legislature. 81           
 
There are a variety of behavioural factors that can influence whether the legislature’s 
tools for exercising oversight over budget execution are effective.  These factors 
centre around capacity and willingness.82   Willingness is about the motivation of 
members to participate in oversight activities while ability is their level of 
competence.83   Ability is a critical requirement for a member/s participating in the 
exercise of budget oversight.   
                                                                
81 Ahmed (2000) 31. 
 
 
82 Ahmed (2000) 30. 
 
83
 Ahmed (2000) 31. 
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To engage confidently with budget data, financial statements, reports and audit 
reports, members of the legislature or any of its committees require the necessary 
capacity.  Capacity enables members of the legislature to conduct independent 
research and analysis.  Only then, members will be able to match the skills levels 
within the executive and the bureaucracy.   
 
Willingness and ability are influenced by internal and external factors.84 Internal 
factors are personal characteristic of members, their orientation to their role and 
responsibilities.  In addition, willingness complements the legal authority and 
capacity for effective oversight.  Willingness is the most important behavioural 
indicator that reflects the political will to exercise oversight.  Accordingly, members of 
the legislature should consistently display an overall attitude that promotes effective 
stewardship and the integrity of public finances.    
 
  
                                                                
84
 Ahmed (2000) 31. 
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3.10 CONCLUSION  
This chapter outlined the budget process.  It discussed the role of the legislature in 
the budget process during the execution stage.  The legal and institutional measures 
required for effective legislative oversight on budget execution were discussed.     
 
The chapter indicated that for budget oversight to be effective, it must adequately 
respond to an institutional and behavioural normative framework.   Addition, the law 
must also endow the legislature with adequate authority to exercise oversight over 
the execution of the budget.  Equally, the law must enable the legislature to 
independently establish appropriate committees which will assist the legislature to 
exercise oversight.  Lastly, the law must enable the legislature to receive regular 
reports from the executive.   
 
Research capacity within the legislature is a further requirement for the effective 
exercise of oversight over the execution of the budget.   Lastly, the legislature must 
be able to develop adequate standing rules to enable effective oversight over the 
execution of the budget. 
 
The capacity and willingness of the members of the legislature to use the legal 
instruments for exercising oversight over the execution of the budget is at the core of 
the behavioural criteria.  Together with the institutional aspects, the behavioural 
aspects endow the legislature with the required structural and behavioural 
characteristics for effective budget oversight.         
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CHAPTER 4:  LEGAL MEASURES FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OVER THE 
EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET IN SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The preceding chapter highlighted the need to anchor the oversight over the budget 
execution in the legal framework.  The relevant statutory and non-statutory 
mechanisms must be established to fortify the role of the legislature in exercising 
oversight over the execution of the budget.   
 
It is against this background that this chapter identifies the legal provisions in the 
South African local government system that respond to the institutional criteria 
discussed in Chapter Three.  In Chapter Three, the authority of the municipal 
council, reports, committees, standing rules and research capacity were highlighted 
as key to institutional criteria for effective budget oversight.   
 
The aim of this section is to identify and discuss the relevant legislative measures for 
budget oversight.  This section does not review of these legal provisions as that is 
attended to in Chapter Five.        
 
4.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT    
In the South African context, local government is a sphere of government provided 
for in terms of Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.85   The 
inclusion of local government in the Constitution represents a significant 
                                                                
85 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.   
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enhancement of the legal status of local government which was hierarchically 
subservient to other levels of government before 1994.86   
 
The current constitutional and legislative scheme has endowed municipalities with a 
constitutionally defined status, constitutional objectives and constitutional powers.  
As indicated by the Constitutional Court in Fedsure Life Assurance and Other v 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council. 87  Local government derives its 
existence directly from the Constitution and accordingly enjoys the legal status and 
authority to determine its own character without being just an administrative arm of 
the other spheres of government.      
 
Another significant aspect of the current status of local government is the 
identification and requirement to fulfil the objects of local government in the 
Constitution.   These objects of local government are to: 
 
(a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;  
(b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;  
(c) promote social and economic development;  
(d) promote a safe and healthy environment; and  
(e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government.88 
 
                                                                
86 Steytler & De Visser (2009)  5-8. 
87 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and others v Johannesburg Transition Metropolitan Council and Others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) (hereafter Fedsure Life Assurance) para 26. 
88 S 152 (1) (a) to (e) Constitution. 
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The above objects of local government have two basic purposes, namely, (a) 
‘development and promotion of democracy; and (b) ensuring that government is 
efficient and effective in the rendering of services and the promotion of social and 
economic development’. 89   The infusion of the purpose of development and 
democratic with efficient and effective service delivery purpose provides an important 
transformative goal that is indispensable to the enormous task of reconstructing 
society.90    
 
These objects of local government, particularly section 152 (1) (a) and (e) of the 
Constitution envisage a type of a municipal governance which is democratic, 
accountable and participatory.  This constitutional mandate establishes a democratic 
dispensation for local government, which rests on representation and people-centred 
governance.91       
 
The other important aspect of the new dispensation of local government is its 
developmental agenda.  The developmental agenda of local government has its 
foundation in the Constitution.  In terms of this constitutional provision, a municipality 
‘must structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning 
processes to give effect to the basic needs of the community and to promote the 
social and economic development of the community’.92  
                                                                
89 Democratic Alliance and Another v Masondo NO and Another 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC) (hereafter DA 
v Masondo para 16. 
90 DA v Masondo para 16. 
 
91 Steytler & De Visser (2009)  5-8 
92 S 153 (a) Constitution 
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At the core of the notion of developmental local governance lies the requirement for 
a collaborative relationship between local citizens, elected representatives and 
municipal officials to collectively contribute towards addressing the social and 
economic challenges facing communities.93   Equally, this notion of developmental 
local governance is reflected in section 2 of the Municipal System Act which defines 
the municipalities as consisting of the council, the administration and the community.                   
 
4.2.1 POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The developmental mandate of local government contemplated in section 153 is 
given effect by the powers and functions provided for in terms of section 156 (1) of 
the Constitution.  According to this section, a municipality has executive authority in 
respect of, and has the right to administer the local government matters listed in Part 
B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5.94      
 
The Schedule 4B matters are:   
 
a) Air pollution; 
b) Building regulations; 
c) Child care facilities; 
d) Electricity and gas reticulation; 
e) Fire-fighting services; 
f) Local tourism; 
g) Municipal airports; 
                                                                
93 S 153 (a) Constitution. 
94 S 156 (1) Constitution. 
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h) Municipal planning; 
i) Municipal health services; 
j) Municipal public transport; 
k) Municipal public works only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to 
them under the Constitution or any other law; 
l) Pontoons, ferries, piers and harbours, excluding the regulation of international and 
national shipping and matters related thereto; 
m) Storm-water management systems in built-up areas; 
n) Trading regulations; and  
o) Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic 
waste-water and sewage disposal systems. 
 
The Schedule 5B matters are: 
a) Beaches and amusement facilities; 
b) Billboards and the display of advertisement in public places; 
c) Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; 
d) Cleansing; 
e) Control of public nuisances; 
f) Control of undertakings that sell food to the public; 
g) Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals; 
h) Fencing and fences; 
i) Licencing of dogs; 
j) Licencing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public; 
k) Local amenities; 
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l) Local sport facilities; 
m) Markets; 
n) Municipal abattoirs; 
o) Municipal parks and recreation; 
p) Municipal roads; 
q) Noise pollution; 
r) Pounds; 
s) Public places; 
t) Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; 
u) Street trading; 
v) Street lighting; and 
w) Traffic and parking.  
 
The original powers listed above are constitutionally entrenched and may be 
qualified or constrained by law but only to the extent the Constitution permits.95   In 
addition to the original powers, the Constitution also envisages that additional 
powers and functions may be transferred to municipalities through assignment.   
 
Assignment is the secondary source of power for local government and the most 
important instrument for transferring additional functions to local government in 
general and also to individual municipalities.96  The Constitution provides that a 
                                                                
95 City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 (3) BCLR 199 (CC) para 60.  
96 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 5-41. 
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municipality has authority over matters assigned to it by national or provincial 
legislation.97   
 
National and provincial legislatures can assign any of their legislative powers to 
specific municipal councils.98   Equally, the Constitution allows Cabinet members to 
and provincial MECs to assign executive powers to specific municipal councils.99   
The assignment of legislative power to the municipal council allocates ‘discretionary 
powers’ whereas the assignment of executive power allocates a ‘duty to do 
something’.100 
 
The assignment of power to municipalities is concluded through an agreement.  This 
indicates that national and provincial governments are not compelled to assign 
powers and functions to municipalities and neither is a municipality compelled to 
accept the assignment of such powers and functions.101  Therefore the agreement 
reflects consensus on the assignment which is accordingly terminated when the 
parties withdraw from the agreement.102    
 
Therefore, the nature of the assignment of powers and functions to municipalities is 
discretionary and informed by the principle of subsidiarity.  Assignment is made 
                                                                
97 S 156 (1)(b) of the Constitution. 
98 S 44 (1) (a) (iii) & 104 (1)(c) Constitution. 
99 S 99 & 126 of the Constitution.   
100 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 5-42. 
101 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 5-42. 
102 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 5-42 
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compulsory if the matter concerned would be most effectively administered locally 
and the municipality has the capacity to administer it.103   
 
National and provincial government must assign the administration of matters listed 
in Schedules 4A or 5A to a municipal council if the following four conditions are met: 
a) ‘the matter in question necessarily relates to local government; 
b) the matter would most effectively be administered locally; 
c) the municipality has the capacity to administer it; and   
d) the municipal council agrees to the assignment’.104 
 
4.2.2 THE LEGAL NATURE AND STATUS OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
The municipal council has been elevated to a ‘deliberative legislative body’ for the 
municipality.105  This entrenchment of the municipal council as the primary and 
critical structure of the municipality has elevated it to the same status of other 
legislatures such as Parliament and provincial legislatures.   Accordingly, the 
municipal council has the requisite legal status to exercise oversight over the 
executive.     
 
One of the key provisions with regard to the legal status of the municipal council is 
the vesting of the ‘the executive and legislative authority of the municipality’ in the 
municipal council.106  This provision entrenches the status of the municipal council at 
                                                                
103 Steytler & De Visser (2009)  5-42 
104
 Steytler & De Visser (2009)  5-42 
105 Fedsure Life Assurance para 41. 
106 S 151 (2) Constitution. 
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the core of the municipality’s decision making processes regarding law making, 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of municipal plans and budget 
and services delivery processes.       
 
The vesting of the municipality’s executive and legislative authority in the council 
indicates that the municipal council has the inherent constitutional powers to 
determine its relationship with the executive and administrative structures.  The 
Constitution provides for the municipal council to ‘make all the decisions concerning 
the exercise of all the powers and performance of all the functions of the 
municipality’.107   As a consequence of this constitutional provision, all municipal 
processes implemented by the executive and administrative structures must have 
the consent of the municipal council, authority, approval and ultimate supervision.  
This imposes significant limitations on the executive and administrative structures by 
requiring the municipal council to approve decisions on key municipal processes.         
 
4.2.3 MUNICIPAL FISCAL AUTHORITY  
It was highlighted in Chapter Two that legislatures usually have and exercise 
authority on the public purse.  Local government in South Africa is also endowed 
with fiscal powers to collect and or receive the requisite financial resources.  As 
indicated in Fedsure Life Assurance, a municipal council is constitutionally 
empowered to collect its own revenue and receive a share of revenue collected 
nationally as part of their equitable share and other conditional allocations.108  ,    
 
                                                                
107 S 160 (1) Constitution. 
108 Fedsure Life Assurance para 44. 
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Specifically, the Constitution reinforces the formative influence of the municipal 
council on municipal finances.109   The municipal council is an exclusive authority for 
(a) the passing of by-laws;  
(b) the approval of the budgets;  
(c) the imposition of rates and other taxes, levies and duties;  
(d) the raising of loans.110 
 
The municipal council’s fiscal powers are its exclusive competency and accordingly 
cannot be delegated to any other structure of the municipality.111   This authority 
signifies the constitutional intention to fortify the municipal council as a supreme 
structure in the budget process, especially in the adoption stage.     
    
Since the authority to approve the budget is vested in the municipal council, it follows 
that it has the inherent power to influence the budgetary activities of the executive 
and administrative structures.  Similarly, the responsibility to approve the budget 
places an obligation on the municipal council to ensure that revenue and spending 
measures are fiscally sound, match the needs of the community with available 
resources, and that they are implemented effectively and efficiently.  
 
Section 160 (2) highlights that the power of the local purse should be more than the 
routine and ritualistic authorisation of the annual budget but a conscious and 
deliberate effort to legislate and control municipal finances.  In this instance, the 
                                                                
109 S 160 (2) Constitution. 
110 S 160 (2) Constitution. 
111 S 160 (2) Constitution. 
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municipal council is expected to establish appropriate mechanisms to enable it to 
exercise effective oversight on municipal financial resources. 
 
It must however be noted that the Constitution grants the National Treasury the 
power to develop national legislation that prescribes measures to ensure both 
transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government.112  To this end, 
the National Treasury must introduce generally recognised accounting practice, 
uniform expenditure classifications, and uniform treasury norms and standards.113  
 
The National Treasury also has the constitutional obligation to enforce compliance 
with the measures established through this national legislation.114  Therefore, the 
municipal council should exercise its fiscal authority in a manner that is consistent 
with section 216 of the Constitution as well any the national legislation established by 
national treasury.    
 
Specifically, the municipal council must exercise its fiscal authority in line with the 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, the relevant sections of the annual 
Division of the Revenue Act, the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act 12 of 
2007 and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2005.    
 
Furthermore, the municipal council should also assist the national treasury in 
enforcing compliance with the Municipal Finance Management Act by ensuring 
                                                                
112 S 216 (1) Constitution.   
113
 S 216 (1) (a) to (c) Constitution.   
114
 S 216 (2) Constitution.   
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compliance with the budgeting processes in their respective municipalities.  The 
council should assist the national and provincial treasuries in ensuring that 
regulations, circulars and guidelines are implemented.      
     
4.3 MEASURES FOR MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
The preceding section highlighted the constitutional provisions pertaining to the 
authority of the municipal council over the budget and oversight functions.  To give 
effect to the constitutional provisions, various statutes and related regulations have 
been enacted to enable the municipal council to exercise budget oversight.  These 
are the Municipal Structures Act115, the Municipal System Act116 and the Municipal 
Finance Management Act.117   
 
4.3.1 MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ACT 
The Municipal Structures Act provides for the processes of establishing 
municipalities and municipal executive structures.  The provisions that are most 
relevant to this study are the municipal objectives, decisions and business of 
municipal council as well as those on the establishment of committees.       
  
                                                                
115 Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.   
116 Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
117  Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.  
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4.3.1.1 MUNICIPAL OBJECTIVES 
The Structures Act instructs the municipal council to strive within its capacity to 
achieve the objectives as set out in section 152 of the Constitution.  In terms of this 
section, a municipal council must annually review its overall performance in 
achieving the objectives outlined in section 152 of the Constitution.118     
 
The above section confirms the role of the municipal council in reviewing the 
performance of the municipalities in achieving its objectives.  This role is a critical 
aspect of oversight including budget oversight.  Accordingly, the municipal council is 
obligated to establish performance measures that will inform the behaviour of the 
other structures of the municipality in realising the municipal objectives. 
 
4.3.1.2 DECISIONS OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
Key decisions of the municipality require the approval of the municipal council.  The 
Structures Act provides that before a municipal council approves of the integrated 
development plan and any amendment to that plan; and the appointment and the 
conditions of service of the municipal manager and a head of a department of the 
municipality, the executive mayor or the executive committees must first submit to 
the council a report and recommendations.119         
 
4.3.1.3 BUSINESS OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL  
Chapter Three indicated that legislatures should establish internal procedures to 
define their rules for exercising oversight.  Accordingly, the Structures Act prescribes 
                                                                
118 S 19 (1) (d) Municipal Structures Act. 
119 S 30 (5) Municipal Structures Act. 
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that ‘a municipal council may make by-laws and prescribe rules of orders for “its 
internal arrangements; its business and proceedings and the establishment, 
composition, procedures, powers and functions of its committees’.120 
 
 4.3.1.4 COMMITTEES OF THE MUNICIPALITY   
One of the criteria for effective oversight over budget execution discussed in Chapter 
Three is the ability of the legislature to establish committees.  It was also indicated in 
Chapter Three that committees are the most effective means of underpinning the 
authority, mechanisms and tools available to the legislature with regard to oversight.  
 
In that regard, section 33 of the Structures Act makes provision for the municipality 
to establish committees.  This section provides that the establishment of committees 
must take into account the extent of the functions and powers of the municipality; the 
need to delegate the powers is to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in their 
performance; and the financial and administrative resources of the municipality 
available to support the proposed committee. 121   
 
Section 79 of the Structures Act also refers to the establishment of committees.   In 
particular, section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act makes provision for the 
establishment of municipal council committees or non-executive committees.  In 
terms of this section, a municipal council may establish one or more committees 
necessary for the effective and efficient performance of any of its functions or the 
                                                                
120 S 31(2) Municipal Structures Act. 
121 S 33 (b) (i) to (iii) Structures Act.  
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exercise of any of its powers.  The council may appoint the members of such 
committees from among its members and dissolve the committee at any time. 122   
 
Furthermore, the municipal council must determine the functions of a committee and 
may delegate duties and powers to them.123  This section also provides for the 
municipal council to appoint the chairperson and authorise the committee to co-opt 
advisory members who are not members of the council within the limits determined 
by the council.  The municipal council may also determine a committee’s procedure.   
 
One of the council committees assisting the municipal council to exercise budget 
oversight is the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPACs).  The departments of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and National Treasury have issued 
joint guidelines on the Municipal Public Accountants Committees (MPACS).124  In 
terms of the guidelines, the MPACs may be established by the municipal council in 
terms of section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act. 125  As a section 79 committee it 
performs an oversight function on behalf of the council.   According to the guidelines 
for their establishment, MPACs report directly to the council through the Speaker of 
                                                                
122 S 79 (1) (a) to (c) Structures Act. 
123 S 79 (2) Structures Act. 
124  Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury The guideline for the 
Establishment of Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) issued jointly by department of 
Cooperative governance and National Treasury (2011).    
125  Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury The guidelines for the 
Establishment of Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) (2011).    
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the municipality and interface with other committees of council through the 
Speaker.126    
 
The primary functions of the MPACs are to consider and evaluate the content of the 
annual report and to make recommendations to council when adopting an oversight 
report on the annual report.  MPACs must also review recommendations and 
implementation of the annual report.   According to the Guidelines, the MPACs 
should be empowered to recommend or undertake any investigation in their area of 
responsibility and to perform any function assigned to it through a resolution of the 
council within its area of responsibility.127        
 
MPACs should consist of non-executive councillors.  Any councillor serving as 
Executive Mayor or Deputy Executive Mayor, Mayor or Deputy Mayor, Speaker, 
Chief Whip, a member of the Mayoral Committee, a member of the Executive 
Committee, are excluded from being members of the MPACs.128  
 
The Guidelines provide that the MPACs should be able to invite representatives of 
the community and co-opt members of the public who have expertise in relevant 
specific fields to assist and advice in the deliberations. 129   Furthermore, the 
                                                                
126 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 6.  
127 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 7. 
128 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 9. 
 
129 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 9. 
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Guidelines provide that the Chairperson of the Committee is to be appointed by 
council resolution and that the council may appoint a Chairperson from parties other 
than the majority parties in Council.130  
 
 
4.3.2 MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT 32 OF 2000 
The Municipal System Act represents another milestone in the processes of building 
an efficient, effective and transparent local public administration that conforms to 
constitutional imperatives.  It provides for systems that ensure collaborative relations 
between municipal councils, administrations and local communities.  In addition, it 
provides for a system of local government that is capable of exercising its 
constitutionally prescribed functions and powers.   
 
4.3.2.1 RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
The Municipal Systems Act reiterates the authority of the municipal council by 
providing that it has the right to govern on its own initiative the local government 
affairs of the local community and to exercise the municipality's executive and 
legislative authority.131   
 
Section 4 (1) (c) (i) and (ii) of the Municipal Systems Act  reiterates that the municipal 
council has the power to finance the affairs of the municipality by charging fees for 
services, imposing surcharges on fees, rates on property.  In addition, the municipal 
council is required to exercise its legislative and executive authority to use the 
                                                                
130 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 11. 
131 S 4 (1) (a) to (c) Municipal Systems Act. 
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resources of the municipality in the best interest of the local community as well as in 
a democratic and accountable manner.   
 
Fourie and Opperman state that the municipal council has, within the municipality’s 
financial and administrative capacity and having regard to the practical 
consideration, the following duties:132  
a) to ensure that municipal services are provided to the local community in a 
financially and environmentally sustainable manner; 
b) to consult the local community about the level of, quality, range and impact of 
municipal services provided by the municipality, either directly or through 
another service provider, and about the available options for service delivery; 
and 
c) to give members of the local community equitable access to the municipal 
services to which they are entitled.133 
 
4.3.2.2 DELEGATION  
Another fundamental element that illustrates the authority of the municipal council as 
referred to in Chapter Three is the concept of delegation.   The Municipal Systems 
Act authorises the municipal council to delegate its functions.  Provision is made for 
the municipal council to ‘develop a system of delegation that will maximise 
                                                                
132 Fourie & Opperman (2007) 43.    
133
 Fourie & Opperman (2007) 43. 
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administrative and operational efficiency and provide adequate checks and balances 
in accordance with that system’.134       
 
The municipal council’s authority to delegate indicates its ability to shape and 
influence the chain of command.135   From the perspective of the municipal council 
being the ‘delegator of power to perform a particular function’ the functioning of the 
executive and administrative structures are manifestations of the delegation authority 
of the municipal council.136   This implies that the delegation arrangement effectively 
subordinates the executive and the administrative structures to the municipal council.   
Therefore, the executive structures, i.e. Executive Mayor, or the Mayor, Executive 
Committees and administrative structures are accountable to the municipal council 
for how they exercise the delegated powers and functions. 
 
Equally, there are reporting obligations by the executive and or the administration to 
whom the delegating authority has delegated a power or duty.  The executive and 
the administrative structures must report to the municipal council at such intervals as 
the council may require, on decisions taken in terms of the delegated power or 
duty.137    
 
                                                                
134 S 59 Municipal Systems Act. 
135 S 59 (1) (a) to (c) Municipal System Act.    
136 Mputumi Camaron Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo SCA 2010 ZASCA 144 (25 November 2010) 
para 16. 
 
137
 S 63 Municipal Systems Act. 
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 A delegation of a power of all or some of its executive power does not ordinarily 
divest the delegator of the power to perform the particular function itself.138    The 
authority to delegate thus establishes an oversight obligation on the municipal 
council to ensure that the implementation is in accordance with the purpose and 
intent of the approved decisions including the budget  
 
4.3.2.3 PERFORMANCE AUDIT COMMITTEE  
A municipality is required to promote a culture of performance management among 
the municipality’s political structures, political office-bearers, councillors and the 
administration. 139    Accordingly, the municipality must establish a performance 
management system that will enable it to conduct, organise and manage the 
performance planning, monitoring, measuring, reviewing, reporting and 
improvements.140   
 
In developing its performance management system, a municipality must ensure that 
the system: 
a) complies with all the requirements set out the Municipal System Act; 
b) demonstrates how it is to operate and be managed from planning stage up to the 
stages of performance review and reporting;  
c) clarifies the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, including the local 
community. 
                                                                
138 Mputumi v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality para 16.  
139 S 38 (b) Municipal Systems Act. 
140 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 7-19. 
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d) clarifies the processes of implementing the system within the framework of the 
integrated development planning process; 
e) determines the frequency of reporting and the lines of accountability for 
performance; 
f) relates to the municipality’s employee performance management processes; and 
g) provides for the procedure by which the system is linked to the municipality’s 
integrated development planning processes.141    
 
A municipality must have a performance audit committee which must be appointed in 
terms of the Regulation 2 (a) of the Municipal Planning and Performance 
Management Regulations.  The performance audit committee is appointed annually 
and consists of at least three members, the majority of which may not be in the 
municipality as councillors or an employee.142  
 
The chairperson of the performance audit committee is appointed by the municipal 
council and must not be an employee or a councillor of the municipality and if the 
chairperson is absent from a specific meeting of the committee, the members 
present must elect a chairperson from the members present to act as a chair for that 
meeting.143       
 
                                                                
141 Reg 7 (2)(a) to (g) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
 
142 Reg 14 (2)(a) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
143
 Reg 14 (2)(d)&(e) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
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The key functions of the performance audit committee are to review the quarterly 
reports submitted to it by the internal auditors.144   The committee must also review 
the municipality’s performance management system and make recommendations in 
this regard to the council of that municipality.  At least twice during the financial year 
submit an audit report to the municipal council concerned.145           
 
In reviewing the municipality’s performance management system, the committee 
must focus on economy, efficiency, effectiveness and impact in so far as the key 
performance indicators and performance targets set by the municipality are 
concerned.146   
 
The committee has the powers to communicate directly with the council, municipal 
manager or the internal and external auditor of the municipality concerned.147  The 
committee may also access any municipal records containing information that is 
needed to perform its duties or exercise its powers.148   Additionally, the committee 
may request any relevant person to attend any of its meetings, and if necessary, to 
provide information requested by the committee.149    The committee may also 
                                                                
144
 Reg 14 (2)(d)&(e) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
145
 Reg 14 (4)(a)(ii) & (iii) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
146
 Reg 14 (4)(b) Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
147
 Reg 14 (4)(c)(i)  Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
148
 Reg 14 (4)(c)(ii)  Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
149
 Reg 14 (4)(c)(iii)  Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
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investigate any matter it deems necessary for the performance of its duties and the 
exercise of its powers.150 
 
The performance audit committee performs ex post oversight.  Its focus on the 
impact of the key performance indicator and targets makes the performance audit 
committee more concerned with evaluation at the end of the financial year.        
 
4.3.3 MUNICIPAL FINANCE MANAGEMENT ACT 56 OF 2003 
The Municipal Finance Management Act is the primary statute regulating the 
finances of the municipality.  The Municipal Finance Management Act is aimed at 
securing sound and sustainable management of the fiscal and financial affairs of 
municipalities and municipal entities by establishing norms and standards and other 
requirements.   
 
In general, the Municipal Finance Management Act gives effect to the constitutional 
provisions on fiscal and budgetary issues.151  It specifically regulates transparency, 
accountability and appropriate lines of responsibility in the fiscal and financial affairs 
of municipalities.  In addition, the Municipal Finance Management Act governs the 
management of revenue, expenditures, as well as the budgetary and financial 
planning processes.   
  
The Municipal Finance Management Act delineates the roles and responsibilities of 
the mayor, councillors and officials.  The executive as represented by the mayor is 
                                                                
150
 Reg 14 (4)(c)(iv)  Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations. 
151 S 215 (1) Constitution. 
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responsible for providing political leadership and overseeing the implementation of 
policies, the officials on the other hand are the implementing agent of the decision of 
the municipal council.152    
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act positions the municipal council as the 
highest authority responsible for approving the budget.153  It can therefore be argued 
that the authority to approve the budget places an obligation on the council to ensure 
that its execution is in accordance with its intent.   Accordingly, it is envisaged that 
the non-executive councillors will perform oversight functions as contemplated by the 
Municipal Finance Management Act.  
 
Fourie and Opperman state that the issues of strengthening accountability, 
oversight, transparency, communication and empowerment are central to the 
Municipal Finance Management Act.154  They further state that councillors now have 
a greater responsibility of financial oversight and are required to exercise greater 
diligence in the financial affairs of the municipality through regular reporting to 
communities on issues such as service delivery and financial performance.155   
 
 
 
 
                                                                
152 S 21 (1) (a) Municipal Finance Management Act.   
153 S 15 (a) and (b) Municipal Finance Management Act  
154 Fourie & Opperman (2007) 9. 
155
 Fourie & Opperman (2007) 9. 
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4.3.3.1 ANNUAL BUDGETS   
The Municipal Finance Management Act provides for the municipal council of a 
municipality to approve an annual budget for each financial year before the start of 
the financial year.156    The approval process requires an obligatory tabling of annual 
budget at a council meeting at least 90 days before the start of the financial year and 
if there is any delay in the tabling of the budget, the mayor must promptly report the 
matter to the council and the MEC for finance.157  
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act stipulates that the mayor of the municipality 
must coordinate the preparation of the budget.158  The mayor must present to the 
municipal council the schedule outlining the key deadlines of the budget at least 10 
months before the start of the financial year.  
 
Following the tabling of the budget by the mayor of the municipality, the municipal 
council must consider the views of key stakeholders such as the local community, 
the National and Provincial Treasury or any other organ of state.159    In addition, the 
municipal council is expected to give the mayor an opportunity to respond to 
submissions as well as revise the budget and table amendments for consideration by 
the council.160       
 
 
                                                                
156 S 24 (1) Municipal Finance Management Act.   
157 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-27. 
158 S 21 (1) (a) and (b) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
159 S 23 (1) (a) and (b) Municipal Finance Management. 
160 S 23 (2) (a) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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The budget must be approved by the resolution of council supported by a majority of 
the members of council.161   Once approved, the budget is binding and must be 
enforced through mechanisms provided for in section 32 of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act.  These mechanisms must generally prevent or impose disciplinary 
proceedings against any person or persons who breach the Municipal Finance 
management Act by committing an unauthorised expenditure, overspending, 
expenditure unrelated to a vote, and expenditure for a purpose other than the 
approved purpose.162      
 
The annual budget facilitates opportunities for the municipal council to exercise ex 
ante budget oversight.  The requirement for the council to approve the budget 
signifies its legislative authority as well as affords the municipal council the 
opportunity to direct the behaviour of the executive regarding the approved budget.    
 
4.3.3.2 ANNUAL REPORT 
The annual report is considered as a key instrument for transparent governance and 
accountability and must be used to report on performance for the year.163  Together 
with annual financial statements, the annual report facilitates effective oversight.164    
 
                                                                
161
 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-27. 
162
 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-27. 
163 National Treasury (2011) 85. 
164 National Treasury (2011) 85. 
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There is a requirement for the accounting officer to attend the council and committee 
meetings at which the annual report is being considered in order to respond to 
questions emanating from the report.165     
 
Every municipality must for each financial year prepare and annual report which 
must be dealt with by the municipal council within nine months after the end of the 
financial year.166   The Act outlines the purpose of the annual report as follows: 
a) to provide a record of the activities of the municipality during the financial year to 
which the report relates’ 
b) to provide a report on performance against the budget of the municipality for the 
financial year; 
c) to promote accountability to the local community for the for the decisions made 
throughout the year by the municipality.167  
 
The annual report of a municipality must include the following content:   
 the annual financial statements; 
 in addition, where a municipality has sole or effective control of a municipal entity, the 
consolidated annual financial statements 
 the Auditor-General’s report on the financial statements 
 any explanations that may be necessary to clarify issues in connection with the 
financial statements; 
                                                                
165  S 129 (2) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
166 S 121 (1) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
167 S 121 (2) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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 an assessment by the accounting officer on any arrears on municipal taxes and 
service charges; 
 particulars of any corrective action taken or to be taken in response to issues raised 
in the audit reports; 
 any information as determined by the municipality or entity; 
 any recommendations of the audit committee, and 
 any other information as may be prescribed.168 
 
It was indicated that the annual report of the municipality must include the annual 
financial statement.  The role of the municipal council in approving the annual 
financial statement is not clearly articulated by the Municipal Finance Management 
Act.  Fourie and Opperman argue that although the Municipal Finance Management 
Act does not spell out the role of the municipal council in approving the annual 
financial statement, ‘the logical inference is that the accounting officer approves 
these statements’.169      
 
4.3.3.3 OVERSIGHT REPORTS  
The council of the municipality must consider the annual report of the municipality 
and any entity under the municipality’s sole or shared control, and by no later than 
two months from the date on which the annual report was tabled in the municipal 
                                                                
168 S 121 (3) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
169 Fourie & Opperman (2007) 9. 
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council, adopt an oversight report containing the council’s comments on the annual 
report.170  The council comments must include a statement whether the council has: 
(a) approved the annual report with or without reservations;  
(b) rejected the report; or  
(c) referred the annual report back for revision on those components that can be 
revised. 
 
4.3.3.4 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES 
The preceding section indicated that an annual report is a requirement placed on all 
municipalities and municipal entities as a key reporting instrument for municipalities 
to report against performance targets outlined in their strategic plans.  The municipal 
council uses its committee or committees to inform consider the annual report and 
make the necessary recommendations.  An oversight committee is usually used for 
the purpose of considering the annual report and making a recommendation to the 
council.  
 
An oversight committee is one of the council committees established in terms of 
section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act.  The decision to establish the oversight 
committee is the prerogative of the municipal council.  The establishment process 
which includes the composition, powers and functions of oversight committees are 
provided through the Guidelines from the National Treasury.171   
 
                                                                
170 S 129 Municipal Finance Management Act. 
171 National Treasury MFMA Circular No 32 of 2006.  
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The guidelines provide that the oversight committees should consist only of the non-
executive councillors.  An oversight committee is established for the ‘detailed 
analysis and review of the annual report and the drafting of an oversight report that 
may be taken to full council for discussion’.172  
 
A suggestion is made that ‘at the same time that the oversight committee is 
analysing the report in detail, other councillors should also be conducting their own 
review of the report’.173  It is envisaged that this would encourage councillors to 
actively undertake the following activities: 
    
 invite, receive and consider inputs from ward committees and other relevant 
stakeholders;  
 consider written comments received on the Annual Report from stakeholders 
participating in the public consultation process; 
 conduct public hearing(s) to allow the local community or any organs of state 
to make representations on the Annual Report; and 
 receive and consider councils’ Performance Audit Committees views and 
comments on the annual financial statements and the performance report.174 
 
The oversight committee exercises ex post oversight.  The focus of the oversight 
committees is the annual report which is an oversight activity taking place at the after 
the end of the financial year. 
                                                                
172 National Treasury MFMA Circular No 32 of 2006. 
173 National Treasury MFMA Circular No 32 of 2006. 
174
 MFMA Circular No 32 of 2006. 
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4.4 SERVICE DELIVERY AND BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (SDBIP) 
The accounting officer of a municipality is responsible for the implementation of the 
municipality’s approved budget.175  The accounting officer is also responsible for 
taking all the reasonable steps to ensure that the spending of funds is in accordance 
with the budget appropriations and that revenue and expenditure are properly 
monitored.   
  
Section 69 (3) (a) and (b) of the Municipal Finance Management Act instructs the 
accounting officer to, no later than 14 days after the approval of the annual budget, 
submit to the mayor a draft Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan 
(SDBIP) for the budget year together with the draft annual performance of the 
municipal manager and all senior managers.     
 
To facilitate the monitoring of the execution of the SDBIP and performance 
agreements, the mayor of the municipality must ensure that monthly projections of 
revenue and expenditure and the service delivery targets and performance indicators 
are published.176 
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act instructs the municipal manager to ensure 
that the funds are spent in accordance with the approved budget and take overall 
responsibility for proper monitoring of revenue and expenditure.177  The municipal 
manager is required to report to council in writing, any impending shortfalls in the 
                                                                
175 S 69 (1) (a) and (b) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
176
 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-37. 
177
 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-37. 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
budget revenue or overspending of the budget as well as any steps taken to prevent 
or fix the shortfall or overspending.178   
 
The SDBIP serves as a tool to ensure that appropriate information is circulated 
internally and externally for the purposes of monitoring the execution of the 
budget.179   The SDBIP is also described as a document that gives meaning to in-
year reporting.180   
 
The National Treasury Guide to Municipal Finance and Management for Councillors 
describes the SDBIP as a tool that gives meaning to in-year reporting based on the 
monthly projections of revenue and expenditure that is aligned to the annual budget 
approved by council.181   
 
Most importantly, the Circular provides that the SDBIP is ‘essentially the 
management and implementation tool which sets in-year information, such as 
quarterly service delivery and monthly budget targets, and links each service delivery 
outputs to the budget of the municipality’.182   
 
The Circular emphasises that the SDBIP enables the council to monitor the 
performance of the municipality against quarterly targets on service delivery.  The 
SDBIP is not a policy and therefore does not require to be approved by the municipal 
                                                                
178 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-37. 
179 National Treasury MFMA Circular No.13 (2005) 2. 
180 S 71 Municipal Finance Management Act. 
181 National Treasury, A Guide to Municipal Finance for Councillors (2006) 77. 
182 National Treasury MFMA Circular No.13 (2005) 2. 
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council.183  The approval of the council on the SDBIP only becomes necessary when 
there are changes to the budget and the performance agreements of senior 
managers.184     
 
4.4.1 MONTHLY BUDGET STATEMENTS  
As indicated, the municipal manager must submit a budget statement on the state of 
the municipal budget to the mayor and the provincial treasury by no later than ten 
working days after the end of each month.185   Budget and financial information must 
be presented in a prescribed format to reflect the following:   
a) actual revenue, per revenue source; 
b) actual borrowings; 
c) actual expenditure per vote; 
d) actual capital expenditure, per vote; 
e) the amount of any intergovernmental transfers received; and  
f) the expenditure against these transfers.186  
 
The Act requires that the municipal manager must submit the monthly budget 
statement to the mayor and that the mayor must determine whether the budget is 
being implemented in accordance with the implementation plan.187   If there are 
problems, the mayor must instruct the municipal manager to ensure that the budget 
                                                                
183 National Treasury MFMA Circular No.13 (2005) 3. 
 
184 National Treasury MFMA Circular No.13 (2005) 3. 
185 S 71 (1) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
186
 S 71 (4) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
187 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-38. 
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is implemented in accordance with the implementation plan and that the expenditure 
and revenue collection proceed in accordance with the budget.188   
 
4.4.2 QUARTERLY REPORTS 
The mayor must within 30 days of the end of each quarter, submit a report to the 
council on the implementation of the budget and the financial state of affairs of the 
municipality.189  The quarterly reports which must be presented in a prescribed 
format in term of the Budget and Reporting Regulations must be consistent with the 
monthly budget statements.190      
 
4.4.3 Mid-Year Budget and Performance Assessment Report 
The mid-year report and performance report is more extensive as it covers both the 
budget and the general performance of the municipality.191    The municipal manager 
must report in a prescribed format on the performance of the municipality during the 
first half of the year, taking into consideration the following aspects:192  
a) the monthly budget statements; 
b) the municipality’s service delivery performance, and its targets and 
performance indicators set in the implementation plan; and 
c) the past year’s annual report and progress on resolving problems identified in 
the report. 
                                                                
188 S 54 (1) (c) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
189 S 52 (d) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
190 Regulation 31 (1) (a) Budget and Reporting Regulations. 
191 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-39. 
192 S 72 (1) (a) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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The mid-year assessment must be done by 25 January each year and the report 
must be submitted to the mayor, the provincial treasury and the national treasury.193    
The mid-year report provides an opportunity for the municipal manager and the 
mayor to assess and if necessary table budget adjustments and revised projections 
for the revenue and expenditure.194     
 
4.4.4 AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The Municipal Finance Management Act provides that every municipality must have 
an audit committee that serves as an independent advisory body.195  The audit 
committee is independent because the majority of its members must come from 
outside the municipality.196   The main function of the audit committee is to advise 
the council on the proper financial management of the municipality197.   
 
The audit committee is appointed by the municipal council and must consist of at 
least three persons, the majority of whom may not be municipal employees. No 
councillors may serve on the audit committee.198  The chairperson of the audit 
committee is appointed by the council and must be one of the outside members.199    
  
  
                                                                
193 S 72 (1) (b) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
194 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-40. 
195 S 166 (1) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
196 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-47. 
197 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-47. 
198 S 166 (4) (a) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
199 S 166 (5) (a) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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The audit committee has the following functions: 
a) advise the municipality, both the council and its office bearers and the 
relevant officials, on all matters relating to the financial management of the 
municipality; 
b) review the annual financial statements to provide the council with an 
authoritative and credible view of: 
 the municipality’s financial position; 
 the municipality’s efficiency and effectiveness; and 
 its overall level of compliance with the MFMA, the annual Division of 
Revenue Act and other applicable legislation. 
c) attend to the issues raised by the Auditor-General in the audit report and  
respond to the council in respect of these issues; 
d) investigate the municipality’s financial affairs at the request of the municipal 
council.200 
  
Considering that the object of the audit committee is to provide an external, objective 
review of the municipality’s finances, members of the committee must have 
appropriate experience for the task at hand.201 
 
  
                                                                
200
 S 166 (2) (a) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
201 Steytler & De Visser (2009) 11-47. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter presented an overview of the legal system of local government in South 
Africa.  The chapter identified and discussed various municipal legal provisions 
relevant to oversight.  These are the legal provisions that inform the authority of the 
municipal council regard the fiscal matters of the municipality, the authority of the 
municipal council in determining its own standing rules, the establishment of 
committees and the reporting requirements.  The discussion on these issues was 
intended to facilitate a review of the legal framework against the institutional criteria 
established in Chapter Three.    
 
Having identified the relevant legal provisions, the next chapter conducts a review of 
how these legal provisions enable or inhibit oversight over the execution of the 
budget.  The review in the next chapter focuses on the institutional and behavioural 
aspects that are important to ensure that the municipal council is able to exercise 
effective oversight over the execution of the budget.    
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CHAPTER 5:  A REVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES FOR 
OVERSIGHT OVER THE EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION   
The effectiveness of the municipal council in exercising oversight over the execution 
of the budget will be determined by the presence of the institutional and behavioural 
criteria.  The institutional criteria include the legal measures that enhance the 
municipal council’s ability to exercise oversight over the execution of the budget.  
The behavioural criteria include the issues of capacity and willingness of the 
members of the municipal council and its committees in exercising budget oversight.   
 
This chapter is the focus of this thesis.  It investigates the extent to which the legal 
authority of the municipal council, the adequacy of the reporting requirements of the 
executive, the appropriateness of the internal rules and the legal provisions for the 
council committees, enable the municipal council to exercise oversight over the 
execution of the budget.  Furthermore, it looks at how the issues of capacity and 
willingness as they are prevalent in municipalities respond to the behavioural criteria 
established in Chapter Three.  
 
The Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) as a monitoring tool 
for the implementation of the budget and the integrated development plan will be 
reviewed separately.  This is because the SDBIP is a critical monitoring tool that 
facilitates concurrent oversight over the execution of the budget.             
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5.2. THE AUTHORITY OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
Chapter Three indicated that legislative budget oversight over the executive is a 
function of the legislature.  The effectiveness of the municipal council to exercise this 
function depends on the constitutional powers of the legislature in relation to the 
executive. The question therefore is whether the legal framework asserts the 
supremacy of the municipal council in the fiscal governance and related matters of 
municipalities.   
 
5.2.1 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
The municipal council has the authority to define and shape the council oversight 
over the execution of the budget.  Constitutional provisions pertaining to the vesting 
of the legislative and executive authority of the municipality in the municipal council 
provides the council with the power to define its role in municipal processes including 
the budget.202     
 
The Constitution states that a municipality has the right to government on its own 
initiate the local government affairs of its community.203  The Municipal Systems Act 
locates this right in the municipal council.204   Thus, the authority of the municipal 
council in terms of taking overall responsibility for governance is adequately 
addressed.       
 
 
                                                                
202 S 151 (2) Constitution. 
203 S 151 (3) Constitution. 
204 S 4 (a) Municipal System Act. 
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The constitutional authority of the municipal council is also established by the 
provision that a municipal council makes decisions concerning the exercise of all the 
powers and performance of all the functions of the municipality.205   The Municipal 
Structures Act gives effect to this provision by requiring the executive structures to 
first submit a report to the municipal council before a council takes a decision on the 
by-law, budget, integrated development plan and the appointment of the municipal 
manager and a head of department of the a municipality.206       
 
The municipal council’s power of the purse, which is fundamental in leveraging the 
council’s authority to dictate and influence the fiscal agenda municipality, is 
adequately entrenched.   This constitutional authority can be used to define the role 
of the municipal council in the authorisation, scrutiny of budget allocation and the ex 
post review of public accounts and performance.  Equally, the constitutional 
instruction prohibiting the delegation of the passing of the budget, imposition of rates 
and taxes and the raising of loans represents the ultimate fortification of the authority 
of the municipal council in fiscal and budgetary matters of the municipality. 
 
The exclusive vesting of the fiscal and budgetary control powers in the municipal 
council and the need for the council to make decisions concerning the exercise of all 
the power and performance of all the functions of the municipality is effectively 
empowering the municipal council to exercise or establish appropriate measures to 
exercise oversight over the execution of the budget.   
                                                                
205 S 160 (a) Constitution. 
206 S 30(5) Municipal Structures Act. 
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The other area reflecting the authority of the municipal council is its power to 
delegate to the executive and administrative structures.  Through the system of 
delegation that is contemplated in terms of the Municipal System Act, 207  the 
municipal council is able to initiate and exercise control mechanisms to ensure that 
the executive and administrative structures behave in accordance with the objectives 
of the municipal council.  
 
Further, local government legislation provides for a number of measures to 
strengthen oversight.  In particular, the legal framework has managed to separate 
and clarify roles and responsibilities of the mayors, executive councillors, non-
executive councillors and officials.208          
 
Accordingly, the legal framework has allocated the mayor the role of providing 
political leadership and development of the budget.209  The municipal manager on 
the other hand holds the primary legal accountability for financial management and 
together with the other senior managers is responsible for the implementation and 
output.210    To complete the oversight and accountability chain, the legislative 
framework identifies the non-executive councillors, as the elected representatives 
responsible for oversight.  
 
 
                                                                
207 S 59 (1) Municipal Systems Act. 
208 National Treasury Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2011) 74 
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 National Treasury Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2011) 74 
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 National Treasury Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2011) 74 
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The Municipal Finance Management Act however fails to complement the 
Constitution and the Municipal System Act in terms of entrenching the role of the 
council in the budget execution stage.  Instead, the Municipal Finance Management 
Act elevates the involvement of the executive structures in the budget execution 
stage.     
 
The vaguely expressed authority and participation of the council in the budget 
execution stage has resulted in the lack of focused oversight which has contributed 
to current high level of financial challenges in municipalities.211      
 
In addition, the conflation of the legislative and executive authority of the municipality 
in the municipal council presents a challenge for budget oversight in general.  It is 
often argued that because this conflation exists within a context of a dominant 
executive, the executive is therefore allowed to overwhelm and relegate the 
municipal council to the periphery of the budget process. 
 
5.2.2 INTERNAL RULES  
The Constitution and other national and provincial legislation do not provide for the 
specific role for the municipal council beyond the approval of the budget.  To the 
extent that the legal framework is silent, it becomes necessary for the municipal 
council to assume the responsibility for determining and regulating the role of the 
municipal council in the budget processes beyond the approval stage.    
 
                                                                
211 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2009) 55. 
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The above determination of the role and responsibilities of the municipal council in 
the budget execution stage can be effected through a proper determination of the 
terms of reference as provided for in section 53 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
According to this provision, the municipal council can ‘specify the role and area of 
responsibility for each political structure and political office bearer of the 
municipality’.212 
 
The municipal council can use its authority to determine the terms of reference as 
well as the internal rules to clearly prescribe the role for itself and that of its 
committees in the exercise of oversight over the execution of the budget.  The terms 
of reference and the internal rules should assist in determining the nature of the role 
of the non-executive councillors during budget execution.    
 
However, it would appear that that there is lack of clarity on the role of different 
structures in the municipality including the non-executive councillors.  For example, 
the report of the Parliamentary Service Delivery Ad Hoc Committees indicates that in 
most municipalities in Mpumalanga and Eastern Cape there is lack of clarity on 
which structures must perform which role.213  This report indicates that this lack of 
clarity has impacted on governance and delivery of services. 
 
5.2.3 REPORTING PROCESSES 
                                                                
212 S 53 (b) Municipal Systems Act.  
213 Parliamentary Monitoring Group Committee Service Delivery Ad Hoc Committee Feedback on 
Oversight Visit (2011)    
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Chapter Three highlighted the significance of a legal framework obligating the 
executive structures to provide regular reports to the legislature.  The Municipal 
Finance Management Act makes provision for the different types of report to be 
submitted to the municipal council.  The list of reports includes the annual report, the 
oversight report, quarterly reports and the mid-year report. 
   
 
The nature, quantity and content of the financial and non-financial reports that must 
be submitted to the municipal council have the potential to exponentially enhance the 
exercise of oversight over the execution of the budget.  It can therefore, be argued 
that the Municipal Finance Management Act provides for adequate reporting that is 
required by the municipal council to exercise effective oversight over the execution of 
the budget. 
 
It was envisaged that the system of reporting as provided by various provisions of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act will ensure that municipalities produce 
reliable and timely information that would provide the council with appropriate 
information needed to realise its oversight function.214   
 
Despite what is considered a comprehensive reporting framework, municipalities 
have experienced challenges in complying with prescribed deadlines, formats and 
the accuracy of information.215   Equally, the quality of the information is still uneven 
                                                                
214 National Treasury Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Reviews (2011) 83. 
215 National Treasury Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Reviews (2011) 76. 
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and unreliable.216  The Auditor-General’s report on the audit outcomes for 2009/10 
indicates that municipalities do not have officials specifically charged with the 
responsibility of collecting, verifying and regularly compiling reports.217  This report 
also indicates that the reported targets, goals and objectives are often not consistent 
with planned performance information.218  
  
The reporting challenges in municipalities have resulted in the National Treasury 
developing a range of diagnostic and process checks to improve the quality of the 
information.  These challenges are also being addressed by initiatives such as the 
Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations of 2009.  The main objective of the 
Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations of 2009 is to regulate the format and 
content of the annual budget, adjustment budgets and in-year reports to promote 
greater transparency.219  
 
5.2.4 COUNCIL COMMITTEES 
As indicated in Chapter Three, the council committees like those of other legislatures 
are regarded as the core of the financial accountability mechanisms.    Depending on 
the delegated authority, committees are able to cover the broad spectrum and 
different aspects of financial and budget oversight activities of the municipality.   
 
Chapter Three also indicated that for the committee to be effective, they must be 
sufficiently independent, have appropriate powers, have access to information, be 
                                                                
216 Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 34. 
217 Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 34. 
218 Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 34. 
219 National Treasury Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Reviews (2011) 76. 
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adequately resourced and be able to undertake in depth and continuous scrutiny of 
the executive. 
 
Council committees are those established in terms of section 79 of the Municipal 
Structures Act.  The oversight committee and Municipal Public Accounts Committee, 
are the two most relevant committees of the council that are required to assist the 
council to exercise budget and financial oversight. 
 
The nature and role of committees contemplated in section 79 of the Structures 
responds and corresponds with the criteria for established in Chapter Three.  As 
stated in Chapter Three, the ability of the legislature to establish independent 
committees delegated with appropriate powers to access information and to hold the 
executive accountable, is essential in strengthening the legislature to exercise 
budget oversight.     
 
The requirement in terms of the guidelines that only the non-executive councillors 
and no officials can serve on the two committees could make committees sufficiently 
independent from the executive and administrative structures. In addition, the 
accountability of the committees to the municipal council helps to insulate the work of 
the oversight committees and the MPACs from executive influence.  
 
Committees entrusted with the responsibility for oversight must have the necessary 
powers.  With regards to the enabling powers and functions relating to the oversight 
over the execution of the budget, the Guidelines propose adequate powers for the 
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MPACs.  The Guidelines provide that MPACs should have the power to have 
permanent referral of documents relating to in-year reports and financial statements 
of the municipality.  MPACs also have as their primary functions the responsibility to 
recommend and undertake any investigation in their area of responsibility, review 
any investigation report already undertaken by the municipality.220   In addition the 
MPACs can also perform any function assigned to it through a resolution of council 
within area if responsibility.221      
 
Given the complexity of the work of these committees, it is imperative that they have 
adequate access to relevant information.  Accordingly, these committees must be 
empowered with relevant powers to access information.  As indicated in Chapter 
Three, information is the lifeblood of oversight.  In this instance also, the MPACs 
should be empowered with access to information from different structures of the 
municipality.     
 
Despite the power to realise their objectives, there are challenges that impact 
negatively on the functions of these committees.  In particular, the oversight 
committees have structural limitations that make them not to be effective in 
exercising their general oversight role.   
 
                                                                
220 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 7. 
221 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs & National Treasury Guidelines for Establishment 
of MPACs (2011) 7. 
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A critical limitation of the oversight committees is that the Municipal Finance 
Management Act not does not make it obligatory for the municipal council to 
establish the oversight committees, neither does it provide for uniform powers and 
functions for the oversight committees.    
 
While the lack of uniform powers and functions for the oversight committees can also 
be an opportunity for the municipal council to define such in terms of their own 
context, it can also lead to the improper use of these committees resulting in their 
failure to realise their core objectives.   
 
The oversight committee’s limited role in the annual report makes it less relevant in 
terms in the exercise of concurrent or in-year budget oversight.  The scope and 
functions of the oversight committee is mainly focused on the annual report after the 
end of the financial year.  This kind of oversight is ex-post and only takes place long 
after the financial year has ended. Therefore, its relevance to the concurrent 
oversight envisaged in the execution of the budget is non-existent.            
 
Unlike the oversight committee, the MPACs can play a critical role in the concurrent 
oversight and by application in the oversight over the execution of the budget.  The 
Guidelines on the MPACs proposes sufficient measures that can make the MPACs 
effective exercising oversight over the execution of the budget.     
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However, there are limitations imposed by the lack of an obligation on the part of the 
municipal council to establish the MPACs.  The Auditor-General reports that MPACs 
are not yet fully functional and that only 103 MPACs have established.222     
 
The other major shortcoming of both the oversight committees and the MPACs is 
that in practice they lack independent capacity and support.  The reliance of these 
committees on the executive and administrative structures for capacity and 
administrative support in order to undertake in-depth scrutiny compromises the 
committees’ effectiveness.      
 
5.2.5 TECHNICAL ADVISORY CAPACITY 
Chapter Three indicated that members of the legislature are generally not appointed 
on the basis of their knowledge or expertise on issues such as the budget or public 
finance.  Therefore, the lack of technical capacity on the part of members of the 
legislature and research and other relevant advice and information, constitute some 
of the critical challenges for effective oversight over the execution of the budget.   
 
While it is appreciated that reports generate useful information for the purposes of 
oversight of budget execution, it is equally acknowledged that information on its own 
is not sufficient.  Being part-time, the non-executive councillors have limited time and 
other responsibilities competing for that time.   
                                                                
222 Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 56. 
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The Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Operation Clean Audit, 
indicates that local governments are beset by inadequate skills on planning, 
budgeting, public financial management and expenditure management.223   
 
Additionally, municipalities are plagued by serious challenges of poor interface 
between financial and non-financial information (in-year-monitoring and quality 
annual reporting) and inadequate systems with regard to corporate governance and 
accountability.224   
 
Budget oversight activities are very intense in that they entail meticulous research, 
studying and analysis of financial information as well as making sense of highly 
technical and onerous information.  Consequently, the skills challenges outlined in 
the clean audit documents are likely to have a serious impact on the ability of non-
executive councillors from exercise oversight on the budget.     
 
This is likely to be compounded by the fact that non-executive councillors generally 
do not have dedicated independent technical capacity support to assist them in 
understanding budgets and financial reports which are often constructed in technical 
formats and language that is inaccessible to ordinary councillors.   
  
                                                                
223 Cooperative Governance and Traditional (2009) Affairs Operation Clean Audit 2009-2014 (2009) 1. 
224 Cooperative Governance and Traditional 2009 Affairs Operation Clean Audit 2009-2014 (2009) 1. 
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5.3 BEHAVIOURAL CRITERIA  
The institutional criteria disused above do not necessarily translate into effective 
exercise of the execution of the budget.  The available legal measures grant the 
municipal council the requisite authority and instruments to enable the council to 
exercise effective oversight over the execution of the budget, but there must be 
willingness and ability on the part of the non-executive councillors to perform the 
budget oversight.        
 
This section discusses how the partisan behaviour of non-executive councillors, lack 
of technical capacity and executive dominance of the budgeting processes and 
SDBIP impact on the municipal council’s ability to exercise effective oversight over 
the execution of the budget.  
 
5.3.1 PARTISAN BEHAVIOUR OF NON-EXECUTIVE COUNCILLORS 
Oversight over the execution and the administration should be the concern and 
interest of all the municipal elected representatives irrespective of their political party 
allegiance.  Non-executive councillors are essentially the touch bearers for oversight 
in municipalities and they therefore have the duty to question, scrutinise and 
investigate the behaviour of the executive structure irrespective of their political party 
affiliation.  In addition, the non-executive councillors have the responsibility to act as 
the guardians of communities to constrain the excesses of the executive and 
administrative structures.      
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However, the relationship between the ruling majority party in the municipality and its 
councillors often negatively affects the proper functioning of the municipality.225   
According to De Visser et al, political party structures other than the council shape 
the behaviour of councillors and this is effected through a very strict culture of party 
discipline.226    
 
The Overview Report on the National State of Local of Local Government 
Assessment indicates that ‘party political factionalism and polarisation of interests 
have indeed contributed to the progressive deterioration of municipal functionality.227  
This assessment report goes further to state that ‘the lack of values, principles or 
ethics in party political contestations indicates that there are officials and public 
representatives for whom public service is not a concern, but rather accruing wealth 
at the expense of poor communities is their priority’.228        
 
Inevitably, non-executive councillors and council committees are influenced by the 
political values, groupings and caucus directives rather than the debate in the council 
processes.  In some instances, political parties hinder the efforts to discipline officials 
who have failed to committed offence.229   
 
                                                                
225 De Visser Steytler & May A Study into the Functionality of Municipal Governance Arrangements 
(2009) 34.  
226
 De Visser Steytler & May A (2009) 34. 
227 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs  (2009) 10. 
 
228 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2009) 10. 
229 De Visser, Steytler & May (2009) 35. 
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This has the potential to hinder the efforts of overseeing the effective execution of 
the budget.  Accordingly, non-executive councillors perform budget oversight 
activities as directed by their party leadership.  This inevitably results in the 
opposition parties carrying the burden of oversight exclusively. 
 
5.3.2 LEADERSHIP AND CAPACITY   
Chapter Three identified weak legislative institutions as a challenge to effective 
oversight.  Weaknesses can be attributed to lack of capacity and political leadership 
on the part of the Speaker, the council itself and council committees.     
 
The Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review indicates that there are 
dysfunctional councils which results in distrust among councillors and that  important 
decisions such as the budget get delayed or are not taken.230      
 
The National State of Local Government Assessment also identified lack of sound 
political leadership, strong organisational capacity and good governance practices as 
some of the factors impacting on non-executive councillors to performance their 
oversight role.231     
 
De Visser et al, state that the calibre of councillors is a problem.232  The impact of 
this on their ability to exercise oversight over the execution of the budget is 
compounded by the fact that non-executive councillors do not have dedicated 
                                                                
230 National Treasury (2011) 24. 
231 Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2009) 23. 
 
232 De Visser, Steytler & May (2009) 45. 
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research support and they are also part time councillors.  Accordingly, councillors 
lack the capacity and the time required to distil what is often technically and 
quantitatively excruciatingly onerous information,    
 
The Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review also indicates that the lack 
of adequate institutional capacity is a significant challenge impacting on the 
municipal councillors to exercise their budget oversight roles and responsibilities.233          
 
The Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review further states that ‘most 
municipal performance failings are due to the lack of capacity, whether it be 
individual, organisational or environmental capacity. 234   Additionally, the Local 
Government Budget and Expenditure Review conclude that efforts to strengthen 
capacity have not encompassed the broad range of issues, such as policies, and 
procedures and organisational ethics.235      
 
5.4 SERVICE DELIVERY AND BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The SDBIP has been identified as perhaps the most important instrument for 
exercising oversight over the execution of the budget.  It was also indicated in the 
preceding section that the SDBIP is the primary process through which the non-
executive councillors are able to exercise actual oversight over the execution of the 
budget.  Accordingly, the SDBIP is the central focus of this section.  The SDBIP is 
                                                                
233
 National Treasury (2011) 110. 
234
 National Treasury (2011) 111. 
235
 National Treasury (2011) 111. 
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the key municipal implementation and monitoring tool designed to be used by a 
range of stakeholders including non-executive councillors for the purposes of 
exercising oversight over the execution of the budget.236   
 
The SDBIP’s focus on the implementation of the budget creates an opportunity for 
the non-executive councillors to direct their oversight efforts to the execution of the 
budget.   
 
It must be noted that the preceding sections identified the broad legal measures that 
are applicable for oversight, including on the budget.  However, this section focuses 
on the measures that are most relevant for exercising oversight over execution of the 
budget.          
 
 
The aim of this section is to review how the current the institutional and behavioural 
measures constrain the municipal council and its committees from utilising the 
SDBIP as the key tool for exercising oversight over the execution of the budget.         
 
5.4.1 EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE IN THE SDBIP 
In was indicated in Chapter Three that executive dominance is a key challenge for 
the legislature to exercise oversight over the execution of the budget.  The impact of 
this executive dominance is that the executive behaviour in the execution of the 
budget is not adequately supervised and monitored, resulting in the legislature being 
marginalised.     
                                                                
236 National Treasury (2006) 78. 
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The planning and budgeting processes which give effect to the SDBIP in 
municipalities are extensively dominated by the executive and administrative 
structures.  The fact that the SDBIP is a management, implementation and 
monitoring tool and not a policy of the municipality limits the authoritativeness of the 
municipal council in using it.  In addition, the SDBIP does not require the approval of 
the municipal council.  What is often observed is that the quarterly presentations by 
the mayor before the municipal council are mere informative session that is unlikely 
to result in significant and meaningful scrutiny by the municipal council.     
 
The above practice insulates the SDBIP from the municipal council and its 
committees. Consequently, the council does not have the authority over what can be 
regarded as the only explicit municipal concurrent budget oversight instrument.    
 
The National Treasury compounds this problem by failing to elevate in-year 
monitoring in the Guidelines.  According to the National Treasury, in-year monitoring 
in the SDBIP is meant be a light form of monitoring and that the council should 
reserve its oversight role for the annual performance at the end of the financial year 
when the mayor tables the annual report of the municipality.237  Inevitably, this 
confinement of the budget oversight tool to the annual report further weakens 
concurrent oversight during budget execution.   
 
                                                                
237 National Treasury MFMA Circular No 13 ( 2005) 4. 
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As indicated in Chapters Three and Four, the unconstraint dominance of the 
executive and administrative structures results in information asymmetry that 
relegates the municipal council to the margins of the budget process.  As a result, 
the non-executive councillors are effectively marginalised in budget execution stage.                 
 
5.4.2 THE SDBIP AND THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
The Municipal Finance Management Act does not create an explicit link between the 
council and the SDBIP.  It is very specific that the SDBIP must be approved by the 
mayor within 28 days after the approval of the budget. 238  There is no explicit 
mention of the council being involved in the approval of the SDBIP.  In terms of the 
Municipal Finance Management Act, the council’s involvement is only required when 
the mayor must report to council on delays in the tabling of the SDBIP or the signing 
of the annual performance agreements.239     
 
The consequence of this requirement is that the municipal council or its committees 
have no defined role in the approval of the SDBIP as a key concurrent budget 
oversight instrument.  Accordingly, the council will have difficulties in using an 
instrument that had no role influencing.  Inevitably, concurrent budget oversight will 
be ineffective.          
 
 
  
                                                                
238 S (53) (1) (c) (ii) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
239 S (53) (2) Municipal Finance Management Act. 
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5.4.3 REPORTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDBIP 
Section 54 (1) (c) of the Municipal Finance Management Act provides that the mayor 
must consider the reports submitted by the accounting officer in terms of section 71 
and 72 of the Municipal Finance Management Act and if necessary, make revisions 
to the SDBIP and performance indicators in the plan.  The revision to the SDBIP may 
only be with the approval of the council due to the revision’s impact on the 
adjustment budget. 
 
The reports contemplated in terms of section 71 and 72 of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act contain information related to the SDBIP.   Again the Act does not 
expressly provide for the municipal council or any of its committees to subject these 
reports to some form of scrutiny in order to either approve or reject.  
 
The National Treasury provides that during the quarterly reviews, non-executive 
councillors should assess whether “the SDBIP is on track and whether the mayor 
and the municipal manager are taking appropriate action to correct any significant 
deviations.”240   However, neither the Municipal Finance Management Act nor the 
Guide to Municipal Finance Management for Councillors, nor the MFMA regulations 
and Circulars provide a clear guidance on how the non-executive councillors should 
participate in the quarterly review.  Mostly importantly, none of the guidelines provide 
opportunities for substantive scrutiny of the monthly and or quarterly reports 
mentioned above. 
 
                                                                
240 National Treasury (2006) 84. 
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5.5 BEHAVIOUR OF EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES  
The behaviour of the executive and the administration has an impact how the council 
exercise its oversight role in the SDBIP. If the executive fails to comply with 
legislative requirements relating to the SDBIP, the municipal council oversight role is 
accordingly adversely affected.241   
 
For example, when the mayor fails to approves the municipality’s service delivery 
and budget implementation plan within 28 days after the approval of the annual 
budget, the council’s oversight role of the SDBIP is negatively impacted.242  
 
A culture of municipal performance is critical to the effective exercise of oversight in 
over the SDBIP and its related activities.  As indicated, the legal framework with 
regard to performance management requires municipalities to complement it with 
adequate procedural rules and particular behaviour councillors.     
 
According to the Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review, municipal 
performance in most municipalities is inadequate, despite many of them having 
developed sophisticated scorecards to assist in the measuring of organisational 
performance.243   The Review points out that the actual translation of the scorecards 
into individual performance agreements for senior managers is often weak.244 
 
                                                                
241
 Consolidate General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 34. 
242 Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 33. 
243
 National Treasury (2011) 120. 
244
 National Treasury (2011) 111. 
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Equally, the inability of the administration to not fully meet their responsibilities 
impacts on the council and its committees to exercise oversight on the SDBIP.  The 
Auditor-General states that too often senior managers in municipalities exercising 
financial management responsibilities did not take reasonable steps within their 
areas of responsibility to ‘ensure that the system of financial management and 
internal control established for the municipality is followed diligently and that all 
information required by the accounting officer for compliance with the provisions of 
the MFMA is submitted timeously to the accounting officer’.245   
 
 
This negatively impact on the non-executive councillors from exercising their 
oversight role.  As indicated in Chapter three, non-executive councillors require 
accurate, comprehensive and timely reports in order to be able to exercise oversight 
over the execution of the budget. 
   
5.5.1 THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES   
The Local Government Budget Expenditure Review states that ‘there is a general 
lack of technical and knowledge necessary for the performance of key duties in 
financial management from an operational perspective’.246    According to the Local 
Government Budget and Expenditure Review, this is a major constraint and one of 
the biggest challenges facing municipalities. 247   This inadequate capacity has 
inevitably resulted in a lack of appropriate financial management in municipalities.  
                                                                
245
 Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the local government audit outcome (2011) 33. 
 
246 National Treasury (2011) 87. 
247 National Treasury (2011) 87. 
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The Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review states that ‘of concern is 
that even when a municipality has an opportunity to appoint new staff to the budget 
and treasury office, very often people within inappropriate experience and 
qualifications get appointed.248   
 
5.6 CONCLUSION  
 This chapter indicates that the municipal councils are characterised institutional 
problems that prevent them from exercising oversight over the execution of the 
budget.  The municipal council does not assert its constitutional authority to 
effectively subordinate the executive structures and the budget processes under the 
authority of the council.  In addition, the chapter indicated that the council does not 
also use its authority to determine internal procedures of the municipality to control 
the behaviour of the executive in the budget execution processes.    
 
The chapter also highlighted the institutional weaknesses that impact on the ability of 
the oversight committee and the MPACs to investigate, scrutinise and influence the 
behaviour of the executive and administrative structures during the execution stage 
of the budget.         
 
In addition, the municipal council needs to establish a culture of governance that will 
encourage non-executive councillors to exercise stewardship of municipal resources.  
                                                                
248
 National Treasury (2011) 89. 
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In addition, this culture of municipal governance must promote institutional and 
behavioural changes to ensure that poor performance is reduced or eliminated.             
 
The chapter also identified the limitations of the institutional behavioural aspects that 
prevent the municipal council to utilise the SDBIP in exercising oversight over the 
execution of the budget.     
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION   
The municipal fiscal challenges, especially with regard to corruption, unauthorised 
expenditure, under-spending and perpetual negative audit outcomes have 
necessitated the need to strengthen oversight over the execution of the budget.   
 
This thesis assessed how the current legal framework for local government enables 
or constrains the municipal council and its committees to exercise oversight over the 
execution of the budget.  This was accomplished by assessing the current municipal 
legal-structural factors and the behavioural factors against the established normative 
framework for effective oversight over the execution of the budget.         
 
The aim of this chapter is to present a summary of the findings.  The chapter also 
make recommendations on possible structural and behavioural factors that can 
strengthen the municipal oversight over the execution of the budget.    
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
Chapter One outlined the background to the study.  It identified the current budget 
and financial challenges as the consequence of lack of adequate of legal and 
institutional measures for oversight over the execution of the budget.  The chapter 
identified the focus and objective of this study as contributing towards to 
strengthening the legal and institutional measure for the municipal council to 
exercise oversight over the execution of the budget.     
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Chapter Two of the study introduced a variety of definitions of oversight.  In 
particular, it contextualised the role of the legislature in oversight.  Of significance to 
this study, this chapter clarified the purpose, authority and the different types of 
legislative oversight a key role of the legislature in modern democracy.   The Chapter 
also found that the authority for legislative oversight is either granted or implied in the 
legal and or political configuration of the relevant structure of government.   It is 
mostly grounded in the power to pass laws and to approve budgets.    
 
Having established the conceptual framework for legislative oversight, Chapter 
Three discusses the role of the legislature in the budget process with the intention of 
identifying the oversight functions during the budget execution stage.  In this regard, 
the study highlighted the need for the legislature to put in place specific legal-
structural and behavioural factors in order to ensure effective oversight of budget 
execution.   
 
This Chapter also identified the challenges to legislative budget oversight. The 
uncontrolled executive dominance, lack of technical and advisory capacity, weak 
institutions of the legislature and lack of adequate access to relevant budget 
information were identified as challenges for oversight over the execution of the 
budget.  The chapter then outlined the institutional criteria required to ensure 
effective oversight over the execution of the budget as being the authority of the 
legislature, reporting requirements, internal rules, committees of the legislature, and 
research capacity.  
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While the legal framework identified above is critical, the behavioural factors such as 
capacity and willingness are equally important and should constitute part of the 
comprehensive measures required to ensure effective oversight over the execution 
of the budget.   
 
Chapter Four provided an overview of the local government system of South Africa.  
It presented and discussed the key legislative provisions elevating the authority of 
the municipal council.  It provided clarity on the municipality’s legislative and 
executive authority to the duty and responsibility to exercise oversight.   
 
The Chapter identified the authority of the municipal council to exercise oversight of 
budget execution.  It also identified relevant provisions that enable the municipal 
council to establish internal rules and procedures.  In addition, the Chapter identified 
and discussed the annual budget process and related reports for budget oversight.  
The Chapter also discussed oversight committee and the MPACs as council 
committees can are used to assist the municipal council in exercising budget 
oversight, including oversight over the execution of the budget. 
 
Most importantly, the Chapter identified that one of the obstacles inhibiting effective 
oversight is the lack of appropriate Rules of Order.  This has denied the municipal 
council internal mechanisms through which the council can assert it authority by 
subjecting the executive to different forms of oversight.      
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Chapter Five provided a review of the legal provisions relevant to budget oversight.  
It assessed whether these legal provisions are responding to the normative 
framework established in chapter three.  This assessment found that the identified 
legislative provisions were generally adequate in facilitating municipal council 
oversight.   
Chapter Five also found that there are the statutory mechanisms are insufficient in 
entrenching the municipal council ability to exercise oversight over the execution of 
the budget.  It therefore highlighted the need to complement this legal authority with 
appropriate internal municipal rules and procedures.           
 
In addition, Chapter Five exposed the partisan behaviour of the non-executive 
councillors, the lack of capacity as impacting on the council’s ability to exercise 
effective oversight over the budget execution.     
  
Overall, the study found that the institutional and behavioural measures condition the 
ability of the municipal council to exercise oversight over the execution of the budget.  
It appears that a critical constraint for non-executive to exercise oversight over the 
execution of the budget is the council’s ability to define appropriate internal rules.  
This deficiency in the internal rules also impact on the organisation and effectiveness 
of committees to exercise oversight over the execution of the budget.         
  
Overall, this study found that the current legal and institutional measures for 
oversight of budget execution are adequate but need to be anchored in formidable 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
internal mechanisms and behavioural practices.  In this regard, the municipal council 
must observe its obligations and use its legislative and leadership role to strengthen 
the will and capacity of non-executive councillors as well as amplify the legal and 
institutional measures for budget oversight.   
 
 If left unattended, the existing formal-structural and behavioural challenges will 
remain complicit to the current financial challenges experienced by municipality.  
Governance, service delivery and local democracy will then remain the main 
causalities.    
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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the above section, this study found that the current legal and institutional 
measures for the municipal council to exercise oversight on budget execution should 
be approved.   Accordingly, the following recommendations are made:  
 
6.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES  
It was highlighted that, in general, the current legal framework, including the 
Constitution does not identify a role for the municipal council during budget 
execution.  While the legal framework is very clear in terms of ex ante oversight that 
is required as part of the municipal council’s authorisation process, the same is not 
formalised in the concurrent oversight of the budget execution.  In this regard, the 
following recommendations should be considered: 
 
 
a) The law should articulate the municipal council’s oversight role more clearly. 
b) The authority of the municipal council on the budget should be expanded to 
include oversight of the budget during its execution and ex post.  This can be 
achieved through the Municipal Finance Management Act directing the 
municipal council to initiate appropriate mechanisms to consider, debate and 
approve or rejects reports from the executive structures. 
c) The municipal council should assess areas that constrain the council or any of 
its committees to exercise effective budget oversight.  The municipal councils 
should specifically assess the system of delegation to ensure that the 
authority and the ability of council and its committees is clearly and 
adequately intensified. 
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d) The municipal council should adopt institutional measures or strengthen 
existing ones to introduce fiscal discipline principles such as transparency, 
accountability and value for money.   
 
e) As part of the institutional measures, the municipal council should adopt a 
focused by-law to regulate the participation of the council and its committees 
in the budget process.  The following issues should be covered in the by-law: 
 The role of the council and its committees in the municipal budget process 
should be clearly specified. 
 The roles and responsibilities of the executive in relation to the council 
should be prescribed in the by-law. 
  Appropriate provisions for the role of the council in the budget execution 
should be covered in the by-law. 
 A list of sanctions that the municipal council can impose for lack of 
compliance should be included in the by-law.  
f) To ensure that MPACs have the necessary jurisdiction to investigate and 
scrutinise the behaviour of the executive and administrative structures with 
regard to budget activities, the municipal council with the support of the 
Department of Cooperative governance and Traditional Affairs and the 
National Treasury should strengthen the current Guidelines to address the 
current ambiguity with regard to the powers and functions of council 
committees.   
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The MPACs also require the municipal council to provide for adequate 
powers, leadership and clear organisational and procedural systems to enable 
them to exercise oversight in an effective manner.  
 
g) The municipal council through the Speaker’s office, should use the council 
committees and other committees such as the audit committee to facilitate an 
integrated approach to budget oversight.  This integrated approach in the 
work of committees should enable the council to assess whether the policies 
of the council are been implemented effectively to enable the council to 
investigate allegations of unauthorised, irregular, and fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure incurred during the year.   
 
 
h) The authority of the municipal council and its committees must be 
strengthened to include the power to subpoena documents and individuals 
(internally and externally) and force them to appear before the council or any 
of its committees.  This effort to enable the council to subpoena should be 
mindful of the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
i) The Municipal Finance Management Act should also instruct the municipal 
council to establish processes and mechanisms to enable the MPACs to 
adequately participate in the SDBIP.  When establishing these mechanisms, 
the council must delegate appropriate ex ante, concurrent and ex post 
oversight powers to the MPACs.  
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j) There is a need to mitigate the exercise of power of the executive in the 
SDBIP.  As indicated, unbridled discretionary powers of the executive in the 
SDBIP allows both the executive and administration to dominate and 
marginalise the non-executive councillors in the budget execution process.   
 
k) The Municipal Finance Management Act should be amended or alternatively 
the council’s rules of order to provide that reports contemplated in terms of 
section 71 and 72 of the Municipal Finance Management must be subjected 
to detailed scrutiny by the council committees before being adopted by the 
municipal council. 
 
l) Since the onus of exercising oversight falls on the non-executive councillors, it 
is crucial that they are provided with technical and advisory capacity.  The 
technical and advisory capacity should be established through a dedicated 
and competent oversight unit in the Speaker’s office to provide support to 
councillors.     
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6.3.2 BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES 
The municipal council should address the behavioural factors of its members to 
ensure meaningful performance of its oversight function.  The following 
recommendations must be considered to address the behavioural factors impacting 
on the oversight of the execution of the budget.  
 
a) The municipal council must promote the exercise of oversight over the 
execution of the budget through promoting and encouraging active 
involvement of the non-executive councillors in the budget process.  It is 
envisaged that when the non-executive councillors take a keen interest and 
participate actively in all the stages of the budget, the oversight over the 
execution of the budget can be enhanced.  
b) The municipal council and its committees responsible for exercising oversight 
over the execution of the budget must conscript all the non-executive 
councillors to a relevant training programme.  The municipal council must also 
ensure that members of the MPACs and the oversight committees attend the 
training programme.  The training of non-executive members and council 
committees must aim specifically at strengthening capacities for budget 
oversight. 
 
Capacity building initiates should also include creating a clear understanding 
and knowledge of the municipal internal accounting systems.  Non-executive 
councillors can benefit from a basic understanding of the system of Generally 
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Recognised Accounting Practices (GRAP) as the financial and accounting 
data is presented using the GRAP system.            
 
c) The municipal council should establish a dedicated unit for supporting the 
non-executive councillors with research and other duties related to oversight.  
This will ensure that non-executive councillors have the necessary access to 
technical capacity and support.   
 
d) The municipal council should establish a culture of good governance.  The 
establishment of a culture of good governance should promote accountability 
and access to information in municipalities.  This has the potential to entrench 
oversight including budget oversight.   
 
e) The municipal council must utilise or establish through the Rules of Order 
appropriate oversight instruments such as questions, debates and 
interpellations to allow the council to raise budget issues during the meetings 
of the municipal council.   
 
f) The   Speaker of the municipal council should provide leadership that fosters 
a culture of honesty, ethical practices and good governance.  The speakers of 
the municipal council should also undertake visits to Parliament to observe 
how the parliamentary portfolio committees and the Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts operate in order to learn more about oversight.     
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It is believed that the implementation of the recommendations will go a long a way in 
improving the institutional and behavioural measures for oversight over the execution 
of the budget. 
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